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THE POLIDCAL ECONOMY OF THE

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978

Eric A. Posner*
INTRODUCTION

Why do we have a bankruptcy law? The conventional story is
that bankruptcy law reflects two requirements of a modem com
mercial economy: a method for the orderly payment of debts owed
to multiple creditors and a means to ensure that individual debtors
retain sufficient assets and rights to maintain a dignified or at least
nonpenurious existence. No doubt this story contains elements of
the truth, but it also has many limitations. The story does not ex
plain many significant attributes of the Bankruptcy Code, including
the administrative structure it establishes, its reliance on a mixture
of federal- and state-determined rights, and its balancing of inter
ests between creditors and debtors.
When commentators try to explain these aspects of the Bank
ruptcy Code, they generally describe them as the result of conflicts
between debtor interests, on the one hand, and creditor interests,
on the other. The outcome is explained as just a compromise re
flecting the relative political power of each group. On reflection,
however, this explanation is not satisfactory. It does not take ac
count of the following factors: (1) different kinds of creditors have
different, and often conflicting, interests; (2) other actors have a
strong interest in the Bankruptcy Code, including lawyers, judges,
agency officials, managers and shareholders of corporations, and
politicians; and, perhaps most significantly, (3) debtors, considered
as the class of people who are potential beneficiaries of bankruptcy
law, do not compose an organized and politically influential group.
A satisfactory explanation of the Bankruptcy Code must take into
account the interests of all relevant parties and the extent of their
political power.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1988, Yale; J.D. 1991,
Harvard. - Ed. Thanks to Barry Adler, Jack Ayer, Douglas Baird, Lucian Bebchuk, Frank
Easterbrook, Bob Feidler, Rich Hynes, Ed Kitch, Ken Klee, Kevin Kordana, Richard Levin,
Harvey Miller, Randy Picker, Ed Rock, David Skeel, Stephen Williams, and participants at a
talk at the University of Virginia Law School and at a conference sponsored by the Institute
for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania. Special thanks to Alan Schwartz and
Ron Trost, who prepared formal comments for the talk at Penn, and to Andrew Gallo, for
valuable research assistance.
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An understanding of the political influences on the origin of the
Bankruptcy Code is of considerable importance at the present time.
In 1994 Congress created a National Bankruptcy Review Commis
sion for the purpose of evaluating the bankruptcy system and pro
posing amendments.1 The Commission has held hearings, has
voted on a variety of proposals, and is expected to issue a report in
October, 1997.2 One question that has not received much attention
concerns the extent to which political realities constrain the Com
mission's behavior and the extent to which they \vill affect Con
gress's reception of its report. One way to approach this question is
to look back at the political background of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, develop a political theory of its origin, and use this
theory to shed light on the political determinants of the bankruptcy
amendment process.
These are the goals of this article. In particular, this article ana
lyzes the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783
and related materials, in the hope of describing the influence of in
terest groups on the final statute. It has, of course, long been as
sumed that certain narrow provisions of the 1978 Act reflect the
influence of interest groups - for example, the section that gives
special protection to security and lease interests in aircraft.4 This
article goes farther and argues that fundamental elements of the
1978 Act reflect political compromises among competing interest
groups. In particular, I claim (1) that the allocation of powers to
bankruptcy judges and trustees resulted from efforts by Congress to
increase its patronage opportunities, (2) that the provisions on ex
emptions resulted from a conflict between federal and state officials
over the power to make transfers to local interest groups, and (3)
that the provisions on business reorganization resulted from efforts
by managers' lawyers and large creditors to maximize their influ
ence on the reorganization of distressed firms, at the expense of
other interests, such as equity and small debt. I make similar claims
about the provisions on reaffirmation, student loans, and the fraud
exception to the right to discharge.
1. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147
{codified at 11 U.S.C. cmt. preceding § 101 {1994)).
2. See National Bankruptcy Reform Commn., NBRC Fact Sheet {last modified Aug. 12,
1997) <http://www.nbrc.gov/facts.html>.
3. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat 2549 {codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. {1994), in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. {1994), and in scattered sections of other titles of U.S.C. {1994)). The
law had no official title and has been called the Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
and the Bankruptcy Code; however, for precision, I use the last term to refer to the bank
ruptcy law as it currently exists - that is, as amended since the 1978 Act.
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 1110 {1994).
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These conclusions grow from the application of ideas from pub
lic choice theory to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code.
The use of this methodology represents a departure from most
bankruptcy scholarship, which is normative, doctrinal, or empirical.
This article, in contrast, analyzes the political determinants of bank
ruptcy law: its contribution is its description of the ways in which
the political process resulted in a particular kind of bankruptcy
system.5
Because of the length of the article, a brief overview will be
helpful to the reader. The argument begins in Part I with a general
discussion of the features that are generally believed to characterize
a socially desirable bankruptcy law. This discussion provides a
baseline for identifying distortions caused by the influence of inter
est groups. To clarify the nature of these political interests, Part II
contains a stylized cast of characters, categorized into debtors, cred
itors, elected and unelected federal authorities, state authorities,
and lawyers, and analyzes their interests in bankruptcy reform. Af
ter some methodological notes in Part ID, Part IV describes the
legal and political background of the Code. It describes the 1898
Act, as amended, that prevailed prior to the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978; it discusses the sources of dissatis
faction with the 1898 Act; and it summarizes the legislative history
of the

1978

Act.

Next come the arguments about the influence of interest groups
on the final statute. Part V analyzes the administrative structure
created by the 1978 Act. Part VI analyzes the exemption rules.
Part VII analyzes the provisions relating to corporate reorganiza
tion. Part vm analyzes three less significant issues that nonethe
less generated a great deal of controversy: the dischargeability of
educational loans, the reaffirmation of debts, and the fraud excep
tion to discharge. The conclusion, Part IX, draws out the implica
tions of the arguments for bankruptcy reform and discusses some of
5. Such a project is long overdue for so significant a piece of legislation as the Bankruptcy
Code. Theoretically informed analyses of legislative history or the law are common for other
areas of the law. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act:
Power, Symbo� and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HAR.v. L. REv. 1379 (1993) {labor law);
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 10
(1991) {laws governing corporate finance); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Take
over Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111 (1987) (state takeover statutes); Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, The Political Economy ofPrivate Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995) (private
legislatures). The only sustained analysis of bankruptcy law from this perspective focuses on
post-1978 law. See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress's Temptation to Defect: A Political and Eco
nomic Theory of Legislative Resolutions of Financial Common Pool Problems (1997) (un
published manuscript, on file with the author).
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the proposals currently before the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission.
I. N ORMATIVE THEORIES

OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

In public choice studies it is standard to describe the optimal
version of the law in question and use interest group theory to ex
plain the observed deviations. This approach raises difficulties be
cause the optimal version of a particular law may be controversial.
Bankruptcy law is no exception. Nevertheless, a few comments on
the academic debate concerning optimal bankruptcy law may pro
vide a useful, if rough, baseline for the political analysis.
A.

Procedures for the Satisfaction of Multiple Claims

The optimal bankruptcy law solves a collective action problem
that arises when a debtor defaults on loans from several creditors.
Default frequently occurs when a debtor borrows from multiple
creditors and has too few assets to pay back all of them. In the
absence of a bankruptcy system, the creditors would have an incen
tive to race to the courthouse and obtain a judgment before the
other creditors realized that the debtor is insolvent. The reason is
that under state law the first creditor to obtain a judgment against a
debtor has a better chance to seize the debtor's assets than later
creditors do. The race to the courthouse creates several costs, in
cluding the cost of monitoring the debtor closely in order to be the
first to detect an impending default and the loss of the going-con
cern or relationship-specific value of assets that occurs when sol
vent debtors with temporary cash-flow problems are driven into
insolvency because creditors prefer seizing assets immediately to
maximizing the value of all the debtor's assets. Bankruptcy law
reduces these costs by providing for an orderly collection proce
dure, including (1) an automatic stay that prevents creditors from
pressing a claim unless it would be destroyed by the delay, and (2) a
distribution system that for the most part respects prebankruptcy
entitlements.6
In theory, the collective action problem could be mitigated
through bargaining. Ex ante, creditors can protect themselves with
security interests, debt covenants, and other contractual provisions;
in the absence of the Bankruptcy Code's restrictions on waivers
6. For discussions of these familiar points, see Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bank
ruptcy, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Spring 1987, at 173; Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L .J 857 (1982).
.
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they could contractually provide for a post-insolvency division of
assets.7 Because the rules designed to ensure an orderly collection
procedure also affect such bargaining, and the influence of rules on
bargaining can be analyzed only with great difficulty, the optimal
design of the collection procedure in bankruptcy remains poorly
understood.
B.

Discharge

The bankruptcy policy of discharge for consumer debtors does
not have as clear an explanation. The puzzle is that debtors, like
creditors, want to minimize the cost of credit. The right to dis
charge, however, increases the cost of credit, because it prevents
creditors from collecting some of their debts, and they must pass on
their costs to debtors in the form of higher interest rates. Although
debtors who face unanticipated costs ex post should be delighted
with the chance of discharging their debts, the policy injures the
interests of debtors as a class. Another way of putting this is that
people who already have a lot of debt may support discharge; but
the vast majority of people, who, whether or not they already have
debt, expect to continue taking on debt into the future, should ob
ject to the (nonwaivable) right to discharge.s
There are two possible solutions to this puzzle.9 The first as
sumes that most people see poverty as an evil and are willing to
pay, through taxes, to see it reduced. The nonwaivable right to dis
charge supplements the welfare system in two useful ways. First, it
discourages debtors from contracting out of the welfare system by
using as collateral assets that are necessary to minimal well-being.
Welfare laws prohibit the use of welfare payments as collateral; dis
charge law (along with exemption law) renders valueless "neces-

·

7. See generally Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofAmerican Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L REv. 311 (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corpo
rate Reorganization, 101 HARv. L REv. 775 (1988); Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions and
the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 519 {1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L REv. 51 {1992); Alan
Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L EcoN. & 0RG. 127 {1997); Alan Schwartz,
Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 595 (1993); see also B arry E.
Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343 (1997) (arguing that inves
tors might prefer ex ante routine liquidation of financially distressed firms).
8. See Ronald A. Dye, An Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Statutes, 24 ECON. INQUIRY
417 (1986).
9. Both are discussed in THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Lome AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY
LAw 225-79 {1986) (discussing discharge and fresh-start policies); the first is discussed in Eric
A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine,
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the' Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL Sruo. 283,
307-08 (1995).
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sary" assets, however defined, and future income as collateral by
barring creditors from collecting from them. Second, the right to
discharge discourages high-risk behavior that would otherwise be
an unavoidable side effect of welfare. Because the welfare system
protects people from some of the downside risk of investments, it
encourages people to take on too much risk. The right to discharge,
however, forces creditors to raise interest rates, discouraging some
debtors from engaging in risky investments whose cost is external
ized on the taxpayer.
On another view, discharge is justified because debtors fre
quently take on more debt than they really want to. They do so
because they are misinformed about the law or about their future
resources, or because cognitive error prevents them from recogniz
ing the risks that accompany debt. There may be elements of truth
in this argument, but no one has shown that these problems are
pervasive enough to justify a departure from the norm of freedom
of contract, and no one has shown that the nonwaivable right to
discharge - rather than waiting periods, mandatory disclosure
statements, and similar laws - is the most appropriate response to
them.
These arguments raise the issue of the optimal level of govern
ment for determining the value and kind of property that should be
shielded from creditors by exemption laws. Most welfare law is de
termined by the states, rather than by the federal government, and
one justification is that states have more information about local
attitudes toward risk and poverty and a stronger incentive to re
spect them. This justification suggests that exemption law should
be left in the hands of the states. A criticism of local control of
welfare, however, is that states externalize the costs of poverty on
other states.10 This criticism suggests that local control of exemp
tion law may also have social costs because of spillovers.11 But the
direction of the spillover is unclear. On the one hand, it is well
known that some states, especially Texas in the nineteenth century,
have chosen generous exemptions laws for the purpose of encour
aging immigration. Competition for immigrants could lead to
suboptimally generous exemption laws. On the other hand, it is
also possible that states would choose suboptimally stingy exemp10. For a discussion of these issues, see F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Mag
nets: The Race for the Top (June 28, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
11. Cf. Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in
the 1990s and the Implications ofChanging Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1262,
1288-1304 (1991) (discussing real estate exemptions and related laws).
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tion laws in order to drive impoverished debtors to other states.
We will return to these issues in Part VI.
C.

Reorganization

The purpose of reorganization is to preserve the going concern
value of firms . A firm that enters bankruptcy and emerges intact
but with a new capital structure may satisfy creditors' claims more
effectively than a firm that is liquidated. There is controversy, how
ever, over how reorganization should proceed. One question is
whether the managers of the debtor should retain control over the
debtor, on the theory that they alone possess the necessary exper
tise, or whether an independent trustee should control the firm dur
ing reorganization, on the theory that the managers have perverse
incentives. Related questions include how much power different
kinds of creditors should have over the plan, the court's role in ap
proving the plan, and the protections given the creditors who vote
against a plan.12
A more complex issue is whether reorganization law should be
concerned solely with maximizing the ex ante value of firms or
should serve more general social functions, such as minimizing the
dislocation that employees would experience if a firm were liqui
dated, or spreading risk among various kinds of equity and debt
investors.13 Either view is theoretically possible, but the first view
is more plausible. One problem with the second view is that no one
has presented evidence showing that fewer jobs are lost when a firm
reorganizes than when a firm is liquidated. In fact, reorganizations
often involve the firing of employees, and liquidations often involve
the selling off of entire components of a business without resulting
in a substantial loss of employment. In addition, one must take ac
count of the decline in the demand for labor outside the firm that
results from keeping alive an inefficient firm Another problem
with the second view is that no one has provided a rigorous expla.

12. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 7; Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model
for Corporate Reorganizations, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983). Some commentators argue
that bankrupt firms should be auctioned off. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case
for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 {1986).
13. For discussions of these issues, see B arry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation,
77 CoRNELL L. REv. 439 (1992); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After
the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 {1988};
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bank
ruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 15 VA. L. REv. 155 (1989). Compare Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987) with Douglas G. Baird, Loss Dis
tribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815
(1987) {debating the basis of business bankruptcy policy).
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nation of how reorganization mitigates dislocation. Such an expla
nation would show, among other things, that unemployment
insurance, job-training programs, and other elements of the welfare
system would fail to soften the transition more effectively than re
organization law does.
D. Administration
A final issue concerns the administration of the optimal bank
ruptcy law. Little can be said at a high level of generality about the
optimal form of administration, but the important issues can be
identified. These issues include: (a) the allocation of powers
among the bankruptcy judge and the trustee; (b) the allocation of
powers among bankruptcy judges and district judges; (c) appoint
ment and tenure of bankruptcy judges, including the question of
which level of government should have the appointment power
(state or federal) and which branch of government (executive or
judicial); and (d) similar questions with respect to the appointment
and tenure of trustees.

II. CAST
A.

OF CHARACTERS

Debtors

The first category of players consists of debtors. Among con
sumer debtors it is useful to distinguish between "continuing debt
ors" and "overburdened debtors." Overburdened debtors are
those debtors that gain more from the one-time transfer of wealth
from creditors to debtors that occurs when discharge rules are made
more generous than they lose from the higher interest rates that
they will have to pay for loans in the future. Continuing debtors are
those for whom this is not true. Overburdened debtors seek the
expansion of their right to discharge; they also prefer a smooth ad
ministrative system if discharge is sufficiently generous. Continuing
debtors presumably prefer the law of discharge and exemption that
properly balances their desire for low interest rates and their desire
for protection if they default on their loans, a balance that may (or
may not) best be achieved through private contracting.
Overburdened debtors may have a strong incentive to organize,
particularly during economic downturns when their financial diffi
culties are most acute; continuing debtors have little incentive to
organize.
It is also important to distinguish actual debtors, whether
overburdened or continuing, from those who purport to represent
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them. The National Consumer Law Center, for example, claims to
represent consumer debtors, but its members have distinct interests
that confilct with the interests of debtors. For example, the mem
bers might prefer laws that generate business for themselves even
though such laws might injure debtors in general and continuing
debtors in particular.
In addition, the managers of corporate debtors have interests
that confilct with the interests of the corporations or their share
holders. Managers have an interest in retaining control of the cor
poration even when new management would increase the value of
the corporation.
Debtors as a class are not represented in the legislative history.

Individual debtors - whether continuing or overburdened - do
not give testimony. Corporate debtors are dumb and must speak

through their putative representatives, the managers. Shareholders
also do not make an appearance. The main debtor-related wit
nesses are lawyer groups, such as the National Consumer Law
Center, and some individual lawyers who mainly represent debtors.
B.

Creditors

Although creditors as a group have many similar interests, they
tend to specialize, and as a result creditors often came into conflict
in the legislative history. Banks, represented by the American
Bankers Association, issue mostly low-risk debt, both secured and
unsecured. Credit unions, represented by the National Credit
Union Association, issue low-risk debt that can be collected easily
through payroll deductions. Finance companies, represented by the
National Consumer Finance Association, issue high-risk debt, often
secured by household goods and often collected through wage gar
nishment.14 The National Association of Credit Management and
the National Commercial Finance Conference represent a variety
of businesses that extend credit to commercial debtors. Trade cred
itors are not represented, except in a diluted fashion by general in
stitutions like the Commercial Law League. Involuntary or
unsophisticated creditors, such as tort creditors and employees, are
not directly represented, except that (some) union members are
represented by (some) unions. Different creditors have different
amounts of power at the state level and at the federal level.
14. See Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EM
ORY L.J. 587, 631-36 (1995).
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Because creditors as a group have an interest in minimizing the
cost of credit, they should support low exemptions, preserving
prebankruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy, and efficient reorganiza
tion schemes.is But each kind of creditor has an interest in raising
the costs of other creditors when doing so drives the customers of
the latter into the arms of the former. For example, banks and
other issuers of low-risk credit may favor exemptions for household
goods in order to eliminate :finance companies' means for ensuring
repayment of their high-risk loans. Credit unions might prefer high
priority for employees' wage claims against a bankrupt employer in
order to reduce the chance that employees who lose wage claims
will default on loans from credit unions. Another conflict arises be
cause some creditors, such as banks, have many long-term loans in
their portfolios, while other creditors, like :finance companies, have
many short-term loans in their portfolios. The first group would
care more about the effect of bankruptcy reform on their existing
assets than would the latter, which can more easily pass on addi
tional costs to its customers.16
C.

Elected Federal Officials

The most important elected federal officials in the legislative
history were members of Congress (the various presidents do not
appear to have taken much of an interest in bankruptcy policy).
Members of Congress played two roles in the legislative history.
First, they testified in favor of or against certain provisions, for ex
ample, the proposed nondischargeability of educational loans. Sec
ond, they voted. Members of Congress had an interest in using the
opportunity of bankruptcy reform to effect self-serving structural
changes in the government. As we shall see, they had an interest in
creating new patronage positions and seizing the power to make
patronage appointments from different levels of government (the
states and localities) and from different branches of the federal gov
ernment (the courts), and they had an interest in gaining control
over areas of policy traditionally in the hands of the states, such as
exemption policy. To be sure, the extent to which Congress could
15. One might argue that creditors should not care about proposed laws that would in·
crease the cost of credit, because loans outstanding at the time of enactment are a small
fraction of future loans, and creditors can pass on increased costs to future borrowers. But
the lost business at the margin may be substantial, and the evidence indicates that the credit
industry has found it worthwhile to try to influence legislation. See Vern Countryman, Bank·
ruptcy and the Individual Debtor - And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth
Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 821-22 (1983); infra notes 189-90.
16. Other important creditors include insurance companies and leasing organizations.
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seize power from other elements of the government was limited by
the independent political power of those elements. In addition, the
goals of the House and the Senate did not always converge: the
conventional wisdom is that the Senate is more sensitive to the in
terests of states with small, rural populations.
D.

Unelected Federal Officials

Unelected federal officials included bankruptcy judges, federal
judges, trustees, and agency officials. As we shall see, bankruptcy
judges had a strong interest in elevating their status to something
like that of the federal judges, and the federal judges had an equally
strong interest in resisting this elevation lest it dilute their status.
Existing trustees may have feared a weakening of their positions. A
few federal agencies also had an interest in the legislation. The
most important were the Securities & Exchange Commission,
which under old law had an important role in the reorganization of
public corporations, and the Justice Department, which had a role
in the nomination of judges.
E.

Lawyers

Different kinds of lawyers had different attitudes toward bank
ruptcy reform. We distinguish among (a) lawyers who specialized
in bankruptcy law and who were represented by the National Bank
ruptcy Conference, (b) lawyers who specialized in commercial law
and were represented by the Commercial Law League, and (c) law
yers generally, who were represented by the American Bar Associ
ation. We will also see lawyer groups with a local tilt, such as the
Dallas Bar Association and the California Bar Association, and
other specialty groups, such as the American College of Trial Law
yers. Lawyers as a class had an interest in ensuring that bankruptcy
reform would not diminish their role in bankruptcy proceedings,
and we shall see them rally against a proposal to give a government
agency the role of counseling consumer debtors. They also had an
interest in enhancing the "judicial" - as opposed to the "adminis
trative" - character of bankruptcy, because judicial proceedings
require the services of people with legal training. But the interests
of creditors' lawyers and debtors' lawyers clashed over the extent to
which bankruptcy law should serve the interests of creditors or
debtors, and the interests of local organizations and national orga-
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nizations clashed over the extent to which bankruptcy law should
be determined by state law or federal law.17
F.

State and Local Authorities

Local authorities, including governors and state legislators, re
sist ceding authority to the federal government. One reason for this
resistance is that they cannot make transfers to their supporters if
they have no control over the law. Another reason is that some
states can enact laws that externalize costs on other states. A third
reason is simply that state officials enjoy the prestige that comes
with power. Consequently, local officials often resist federal efforts
to preempt state law. With respect to bankruptcy law, however, lo
cal officials are constrained by Congress' constitutional authority to
enact a bankruptcy law.1s Because Congress has all the bargaining
power, local officials can retain local control only when they can
give more to Congress in the form of payoffs than Congress could
obtain itself through direct regulation. As we shall see, this is a
possible explanation for the outcome of the battle over control of
exemption policy.
G.

Academics

Academics should be mentioned, since they testified frequently.
It is not clear that they should be categorized as a separate interest
group, however, since they appeared usually as lawyers represent
ing various constituencies. Sometimes they simply provided infor
mation, such as statistics on bankruptcy filings and the history of
bankruptcy law.
ill.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

To analyze a phenomenon as complicated as the legislative his
tory of the Bankruptcy Code, one must make simplifying method
ological assumptions. Ideally, we would like to make some
assumptions about how political actors behave, on the basis of
which we could make "predictions" about the content of the final
law, which could be confirmed or falsified by looking at actual
events. In practice, we find that the predictions are rough and the
events used to test them are messy. Materials available to the re17. The political power of lawyers has been extensively studied. See, e.g., Larry E. Rib
stein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEOAL
STUD. 131, 144 {1996).
18. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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searcher, like legislative history, does not necessarily reveal what
happened in back rooms and over lunch. Nonetheless, the materi
als do allow one to adjudicate among the claims of rival hypotheses.
We assume that agents maximize utility. Creditors, debtors,
lawyers, and other citizens seek legislation that transfers wealth to
them. Judges and other government officials seek prestige, either
for its own sake or for its effect on future income. We adopt the
standard public choice view that a relatively small number of peo
ple with similar interests and a lot at stake will have more of an
incentive to organize into politically effective interest groups, while
larger numbers of people will have less of an incentive to form such
groups. Interest groups have a disproportionate influence on the
outcome of legislation, because politicians depend on their financial
support for reelection and because politicians depend on the infor
mation supplied by interest groups with respect to legislative
proposals.19
But if interest group influence is disproportionate, it is not com
plete. Legislators maximize their utility by supporting legislation
that increases their chances of reelection, but this does not imply
that legislators vote only for legislation supported by the most pow
erful interest groups. Citizens pay attention to some issues and will
vote against politicians who frequently support an interest group at
the expense of the public. Politicians may need money from the
interest groups, but they also need to be able to make a credible
claim to voters that they vote consistently with their constituents'
interests. The pressure to pay off an interest group while not alien
ating voters sometimes results in attempts to disguise transfers to
interest groups so they cannot be easily identified as such by the
voters.20
These assumptions produce several hypotheses at a general
level: (1) when the public has little interest in an area of legislation,
the legislative outcome will transfer resources from the public to
interest groups; (2) when powerful interest groups conflict, the leg
islative outcome will reflect a compromise between them; (3)
House and Senate bills will differ according to the influence of dif
ferent interest groups in the jurisdictions from which members ob19. The latter point, sometimes overlooked, explai,ns why even public-spirited legislators
are influenced disproportionately by interest groups. For a discussion, see MALCOLM E. JEW
ELL & SAMUEL C. PATIERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 195-202
(4th ed. 1986).
20. A survey of this literature can be found in William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger,
Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. Pot.. Ser. 512
(1991).
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tain their political power; (4) interest groups will seek the
placement of legislative power in the level of government in a fed
eral system in which they have the most influence; and (5) as noted
above, legislators will disguise transfers when the transfers would
otherwise injure the public in a visible way. These hypotheses will
guide the discussion below, and will be refined in light of the
evidence.
For the most part, the analysis will ignore institutional issues,
such as the committee structure in Congress. Although committees
are important,21 their influence on legislation is not well under
stood, and the likely gain from examining their role in bankruptcy
reform does not justify the increase in the complexity and length of
the discussion that would be necessary.
Public-choice analysis frequently ignores ideology, arguing that
interest groups seek to acquire wealth rather than vindicate ideo
logical commitments, and members of the public, whether or not
ideologically motivated, rarely have the resources or inclination to
oppose the efforts of the interest groups. The assumption is useful
in some contexts, but it is clearly not always true.22 For example, as
Mark Roe shows, the ideology of populism - characterized by a
suspicion of concentrated economic and political power - accounts
at least partly for the laws that fragment ownership of public corpo
rations.23 If populism has influenced corporate law, it seems likely
that it also has influenced bankruptcy law.
Ideology, however, played only a minor role in the legislative
history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. As one would expect, creditors
invoked the traditions of laissez faire in this country, and certain
debtor and lawyer groups invoked the tradition of providing protec
tion to the poor. But everyone seems to have acknowledged both
that credit plays an important role in the economy and should not
be overly restricted, and that bankruptcy law serves as a safety net.
Much of the debate was about the proper tradeoff: a technical deci
sion made against an unquestioned ideology of welfare-state capi
talism. Populist arguments did not appear in the legislative history,
though no doubt they played an indirect role through their influ21. See, e.g., Heinz Eulau & Vera McCluggage, Standing Committees in Legislatures, in
395 (Gerhard Loewenberg et al. eds., 1985).
22. Ideological arguments have made a comeback recently. See, e.g., KEITH T. PooLE &
HOWARD RosENTIJAL, CoNGRESS: A PoLITICAL-EcoNOMIC HISTORY OF RoLL CALL VOT·
ING (1997).
23. See MARK J. RoE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL RooTS OF
AMERICAN CORP ORATE FINANCE (1994); Roe, supra note 5.
HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
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ence on the development of prior legislation.24 There were a few
desultory appeals to states' rights. It is possible that populism,
states' rights, and other ideologies, such as New Deal liberalism,
played a powerful role in shaping perceptions, even if they were not
clearly expressed in the debates; we consider this possibility below.
IV.

LEGAL BACKGROUND OF

A.

THE

1978 Acr

The 1898 Act as Amended

On the eve of the passage of the 1978 Act bankruptcy law was a
complicated and arcane field. The complexity was due to many fac
tors. The 1898 Act was itself complicated and vague, and it re
flected needs produced by economic and social conditions,
including a severe depression, that no longer existed in the second
half of the twentieth century. Moreover, Congress had amended
the 1898 Act many times, and courts had interpreted the 1898 Act
and its amendments in an aggressive way, resulting in a law of
bankruptcy that often bore little relation to the statutory text. By
the 1960s observers were expressing a great deal of dissatisfaction
with the bankruptcy system. The following sections describe the
old law and the criticisms most frequently raised against it.
1. Administrative Structure
The two main players under the old bankruptcy law were the
bankruptcy judge and the trustee. The bankruptcy judge - prior to
1973 officially known as the "referee" and sometimes unofficially so
called up until 197825 - decided the disputes that arose in connec
tion with bankruptcy cases. The referee system was controlled by
the Judicial Conference of the United States and administered by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.26 The bank
ruptcy judge was appointed by panels of district judges for six-year
terms. Originally, the bankruptcy judge had been considered to be
24. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy
Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 465, 497-99. Skeel points to populist influence on the bankruptcy
legislation of the 1930s, which transferred power from managers and lawyers to the SEC.
Although Skeel argues that populism continues to be a powerful force, the 1978 Act reversed
the effects of the earlier legislation.
25. Federal judges continued to call bankruptcy judges "referees" up until 1978, see, e.g.,
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SEP
TEMBER 23-24, 1976, at 47-52 {1976), even though they had submitted to the pressure for the
change in 1973, see Bankruptcy Rule 901(7) (1973). The significance of this mildly insulting
practice will appear subsequently.
26. See Commission to Study Bankruptcy Laws, 1968: Hearings on SJ. Res. 100 Before
the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 53 (1968)
[hereinafter 1968 Senate Hearings] (statement of Judge Edward Weinfeld).
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a kind of clerk or "adjunct" of the district court. The district court
had jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case, and although it delegated
most of the decisionmaking functions to the bankruptcy judge, ap
peal from the bankruptcy judge's order was to the district court. In
practice, the bankruptcy judge had a great deal of power over the
day-to-day operation of the bankruptcy proceeding. The district
courts would rarely conduct bankruptcy hearings themselves. The
bankruptcy judge made routine decisions regarding the property in
the bankruptcy estate (summary jurisdiction) and made decisions
regarding property in the possession of third parties when all con
sented (plenary jurisdiction).27 Some commentators argued that
the bankruptcy judges did not have· sufficient jurisdictional and re
medial powers to decide cases in an expeditious way - they would
have to refer issues outside their power to the supervising district
court - and that bankruptcy judges' subordinate status weakened
their authority with litigants.
The trustee was a private individual, usually a lawyer, who
would represent and administer the debtor's estate. When, as fre
quently happened, the creditors did not elect the trustee, the trustee
would be appointed by the bankruptcy judge. The trustee per
formed many of the functions associated with the trustee today, in
cluding those of rejecting executory contracts, operating the
debtor's business, pursuing people against whom the debtor had a
claim, and arguing the estate's case before the court. However, the
pre-1978 bankruptcy judge often engaged in activities within the
domain of the post-1978 trustee. The bankruptcy judge would,
along with the trustee, attend the first creditor's meetings. As a
result, the judge would hear evidence that would not be admissible
at trial. The bankruptcy judge and the trustee would have frequent
ex parte contact. Sometimes a bankruptcy judge would persuade a
trustee to pursue a particular course of action, such as going after
property, then rule on the trustee's behavior at a later hearing.
Sometimes, a bankruptcy judge would actually negotiate contracts
with interested parties - such as between union and management
- and give business advice to a debtor in possession. The close
contact between the bankruptcy judge and the trustee raised con
cerns that bankruptcy judges biased their decisions in favor of
trustees.28
27. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 89 {1977).
See id. at 89-91; Richard B. Levin & Kenneth N. Klee, The Original Intent of the
United States Trnstee System, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Jan. 1993, at 2, 2-3.
28.
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2. Exemptions
The 1898 Act incorporated state exemptions by reference.29
State exemptions were rules that prevented creditors in state ac
tions from collecting debts from debtors by seizing and selling off
the exempt assets. These laws exhibited striking diversity in their
generosity and in the kind of property protected. The Maryland
statute in 1960, for example, provided for a $100 exemption in real
property, $100 in wages, insurance proceeds, and various other
streams of income, and all wearing apparel, books, and tools of the
trade. The Texas statute provided an exemption for a rural home
stead of 200 acres of unlimited value or an urban residential and
business homestead worth up to $5,000 exclusive of improvements,
all furniture, wearing apparel, a large quantity of livestock, and sim
ilar items. According to one study, the average exemption claim in
Maryland was $188 and in Florida was $7,427, with a national aver
age of $943. The exemption laws differed in a variety of other ways.
Many exemption statutes were archaic, singling out bibles, guns,
crops, or farm animals. They reflected the rural origins of states
that had since become highly urbanized. Some allowed debtors to
waive the exemptions in a contract, others did not. Some allowed
debtors to avoid liens, others did not. Some exemption laws had
been aggressively modified through common law development,
others had not. The lack of uniformity among the statutes, the ob
solescence of many of them, and the unintelligibility of some of
them led commentators to call for the creation of a uniform system
of federal exemptions.30

3. Business Reorganization
On the eve of the 1978 Act, there were three forms of business
reorganization - Chapters X, XI, and XII. Chapter XII was spe
cialized and rarely used, so it will not be discussed. Chapters X and
XI emerged in a loose way from two common law forms of reorgan
ization: the equity receivership (Chapter X) and the composition
(Chapter XI). Simplifying greatly, the equity receivership was a
process by which the major creditors of a debtor would, often with
the consent of the debtor, obtain a foreclosure and purchase its as29. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (repealed 1978).
30. The statistics and the descriptions of the statutes come from Vern Countryman, For a
New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 678, 681-84 (1960). See also
Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE LJ. 1459, 1465-69
(1959). But see Frank R. Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L
REv. 445 (1960) (defending the old system).
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sets using a newly formed corporation of which all creditors re
ceived a share (of equity or debt). A court would appoint a
receiver, usually chosen by the major creditors, and creditors could
enforce their claims through this receiver. In theory, dissenting
creditors were protected by the "absolute priority rule," which held
that senior creditors must be paid in full before junior creditors re
ceive any value.31 In practice, courts circumvented this rule in or
der to avoid defeating reorganizations. There was generally little
judicial review of the process or the plan eventually agreed to, any
way, and, as a result, creditors and commentators frequently ac
cused managers and senior creditors of conspiring to squeeze out
intermediate debt and nonmanagement equity.32
Compositions occurred when all creditors consented to a reor
ganization of the debtor's capital structure. The problem with com
positions was that if any creditor declined to cooperate, that
creditor either had to be paid off or the composition could not oc
cur. Compositions generally involved the reorganization of small,
closely held firms, rather than public corporations.33
Dissatisfaction with the common law of reorganization resulted
in calls for reform and eventually in legislative amendment in the
1930s. Initial proposals were resisted by the bankruptcy bar appar
ently because (1) its members would lose the benefit of years of
experience with the old law, and (2) the proposals would have cre
ated a centralized bureaucracy that would take business from the
lawyers.34 When the dust settled in 1938, Chapters X and XI had
been created.
Chapter X, the successor of the equity receivership, created ad
ditional procedural protections. A Chapter X petition could be
filed either by the creditors or by the debtors. If the judge ap
proved the petition, he or she would appoint a trustee, who was
supposed to operate the debtor's business. The trustee and the
creditors could propose plans, but they had to meet elaborate re
quirements for disclosure of information concerning the relation
ships of the parties. Thanks to some aggressive interpretation by
31. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
32. See REPORT OF THE CoMMN. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 238-39 (1973) (quoting SECURITIES & ExCH. CoMMN., REPORT ON
THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF
PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, pt. 8, at 24-26, 29 (1940). See generally
John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REv. 963, 968-73
(1989).
33. See Ayer, supra note 32, at 977.
34. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 239.
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the Supreme Court, the absolute priority rule prevailed.35 The
judge was required to dismiss Chapter X petitions if adequate relief
existed under Chapter XI. The SEC had the duty to evaluate the
plan and in practice had an important role in the proceedings.36
Chapter XI, the successor of the composition, was intended to
be used by small, closely held firms. It applied to cases in which all
the debt is unsecured; the plan could not affect secured debt. The
debtor alone had the power to commence proceedings in Chapter
XI, and it alone could make a proposal. Judicial approval of the
petition was not necessary. Creditors were supposed to be repre
sented by a creditors' committee, but the latter was often domi
nated by the more powerful creditors. The plan did not have to
satisfy the absolute priority rule; it could be confirmed as long as
creditors would receive no less under the plan than they would re
ceive from liquidation. The SEC had no role in Chapter XI.37
Chapter X and XI proceedings evolved in ways not foreseen by
the drafters. Although, as noted, the drafters intended Chapter XI
for close corporations and Chapter X for public corporations, they
did not put rules reflecting these intentions in the statute. Debtors
of both kinds preferred Chapter XI, and helped along by a contro
versial Supreme Court case,38 usually succeeded in reorganizing
under Chapter XI, despite the SEC's time-consuming efforts to
convert to Chapter X. By the eve of the 1978 Act, Chapter XI had
become the dominant form of reorganization.
The benign interpretation of this development is that Chapter
XI proved to be more flexible than Chapter X; the skeptical inter
pretation, as we will see, is that Chapter XI gave certain powerful
interests - managers, managers' lawyers, large creditors - advan
tages during reorganization. One's choice between the two inter
pretations would probably depend on how one judged the
performance of the SEC. The SEC routinely exercised its right to
intervene and be heard on Chapter X matters, participated in meet
ings and conferences, challenged the qualifications of trustees, at
tacked the representation of interests on creditors' committees,
scrutinized the trustee's administration of the estate, challenged at
tempts to sell the debtor's property, opposed plans of reorganiza
tion that did not adhere to the absolute priority rule, and criticized
35. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). For details, see Ayer, supra note 32, at 974-78.
36. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 240-46.
37. See id.
38. See General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
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compensation arrangements.39 These interventions were time con
suming, and they were considered a nuisance by those who sought
to push through a reorganization plan. But they may also have pro
tected bondholders and equityholders who did not have a large
enough stake to participate in the reorganization. The main disad
vantage of Chapter XI - that debtors could not modify the rights
of secured creditors - was overcome through common law devel
opment. A stay would prevent secured creditors from repossessing
collateral until the debtor had negotiated a plan with the unsecured
creditors, after which the debtor could pay off the secured creditor.
The debtor did not have to compensate the secured creditor for the
lost opportunity to use the collateral and so had leverage with
which to extract concessions from the secured creditor.
There were other problems with Chapters X and XI, including
most prominently the lengthy litigation that was necessary to re
solve the question of which chapter was appropriate. After a
debtor filed under Chapter XI, the SEC would sometimes raise this
question by moving for conversion to Chapter X. Determining
which chapter applied was difficult because of the vague "as
needed" test created by the Supreme Court.40 This benefited the
debtor and its management, because they could use the threat of
delay and the consequent diminution in the value of assets that
could satisfy the creditors' claims to obtain concessions from the
creditors. Dissatisfaction with the complexity and manipulability of
reorganization law led to calls for reform.

4. Miscellaneous
Under the "miscellaneous" category we gather several issues
that were not as important as administrative structure, exemption
policy, and reorganization but that nonetheless received a great
deal of attention during the legislative history of the 1978 Act. The
first issue concerned whether debtors could too easily discharge ed
ucational loans, in effect converting the federal loan programs into
tuition subsidies. The second issue concerned the practice of reaf
firmation. Debtors frequently promised to pay prebankruptcy
debts in return for postbankruptcy credit from the same creditor.
39. See Michael E. Hooton, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission Under
Chapter X, Chapter XI and Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. &
CoM. L. REv. 427 (1977).
40. See Shlensky, 350 U.S. at 466. Shlensky rejected the view that Chapter XI is unavaila

ble to large public corporations, holding instead that the propriety of Chapter XI depends on
the "needs" of the debtor. The choice between chapters thus always would be a fact-sensitive
inquiry.
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Commentators argued that this practice undermined bankruptcy's
fresh-start goal. The third issue was whether shady creditors
manipulated the fraud exception to discharge - under which dis
charge was denied if the debtor had made a fraudulent statement to
creditors - with the result that many debtors could not obtain the
fresh start they deserved. The argument was that creditors would
have debtors fill out confusing forms with the intention of causing
debtors to fail to list all their assets and liabilities. This would con
stitute fraud, resulting in a denial of discharge.
B. Legislative History of the 1978 Act
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act is com
plex.41 It consists of thousands of pages of hearings, reports, and
debates spanning a decade. To simplify the analysis, we divide the
legislative history into three stages. The first stage extends from the
enactment of the law creating a bankruptcy commission in 1968 to
the commission's release of a report and proposed bill in 1973. The
second stage extends from the House and Senate hearings on the
commission's bill and on an alternative proposed by a group of
bankruptcy judges, mainly in 1975 and 1976, to the passage of
House Bill 8200 and Senate Bill 2266 in 1978. The third stage cov
ers the resolution of the conflicts between House Bill 8200 and Sen
ate Bill 2266, leading to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
in November, 1978. A brief description of these events sets the
stage for the analysis and foreshadows many of its themes.
1. Stage 1
Growing dissatisfaction with the bankruptcy laws in the 1960s
persuaded first a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee
and then the full Congress to create a commission to evaluate the
bankruptcy laws. The original Senate bill provided that the com
mission would consist of representatives from the House and Sen
ate, three bankruptcy judges, and three businessmen.42 Apparently
in response to objections from the federal judiciary to the presence
of bankruptcy judges and the absence of Article m judges,43 the
House version of the bill provided for three presidential appointees,
41. For a detailed synopsis of the legislative history, see Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative
History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275 (1980). See also Congress
Approves New Bankruptcy System, 34 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 179 (1978). This section relies on
these articles, as well as on the original statutory sources.
42. See SJ. Res. 100, 90th Cong., § 2(a) (1968).
43. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 53-55, 63-65 (statement and testimony of
Judge Edward Weinfeld).
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two representatives from the House, two representatives from the
Senate, and two appointees of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. This version passed the full Congress in 1968.44
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
was formed in 1971 and met over the next two years. In 1973 the
Commission issued a report criticizing the existing bankruptcy laws
and proposing a legislative replacement known as the Commission's
Bill, or CB.45 The Commission listed the following complaints
about the bankruptcy laws:

1.

The rapid increase of bankruptcies from 10,196 in 1946 to
and especially of consumer bankruptcies.46

208,329 in 1967,
2.

Administrative waste. For example, in 1972 $6.7 million of
the $17 million spent on the operation of bankruptcy courts
was spent on no-asset cases.47

3.

Insufficiently generous fresh start for debtors, and inade
quate incentives for creditors to collect in bankruptcy.4s

4.
5.

Lack of uniformity in the treatment of debtors.49
Abusive or negligent practices by bankruptcy judges, trust
ees, and bankruptcy lawyers.so

The CB contained many modifications of the bankruptcy sys
tem, but three stood out. First, it provided for a sharper distinction
between bankruptcy judges and trustees, elevating the status of the
bankruptcy judges and placing the trustees in a new, centralized
bankruptcy agency in the executive branch.51 Second, it provided
for a system of uniform federal exemptions.s2 Third, its reorganiza-

44. The Commission was created by the Law of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat.
468 (eliminated 1973); for the hearings that led to this law, see Bankruptcy: Hearings on SJ.
Res. 88, H.R. 6665, & H.R. 12250 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Jud/cl·
ary, 91st Cong. (1969); 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 26. The Commission and other
participants were influenced by STANLEY ET AL, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, RE
FORM {1971).
45. The CB was drafted by Frank Kennedy and his staff on the Commission. See FRANK
R. KENNEDY, THE ORIGINS AND G Rowra OF BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION LAws IN
nm 20ra CENruRY: AN ORAL HisroRY PERsPECTIVE 49-51 {1994).

46. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 2 {1973).
47. See id. at 3. It should be noted that this statistic may not actually indicate waste but
just that a large number of cases were no-asset cases.
48.

See id. at 3-4.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 4.
See id.
See id. at 6-8.
See id. at 11.
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tion provisions consolidated Chapters X, XI, and XII and modified
the procedural and substantive rules of confirmation.s3
Infuriated by their exclusion from the Commission and suspi
cious of its capacity to produce an adequate bill, the bankruptcy
judges created their own bill, known as the Judges' Bill, or JB . The
CB and the JB had many similarities but several important differ
ences.s4 The bankruptcy judge under the JB was to have more
power and status than the bankruptcy judge under the CB, and the
JB did not provide for a bankruptcy agency. The JB provided for
minimum, rather than uniform, federal exemptions. Although both
bills had special provisions for publicly held corporations, the JB,
unlike the CB, would have maintained separate tracks for close cor
porations and public corporations.
2. Stage 2
Representatives Don Edwards and Charles Wiggins introduced
the CB in 1973, but little was accomplished that year. In 1974 Ed
wards and Wiggins reintroduced the CB as House Bill 31 and the
JB as House Bill 32 and during 1975 and 1976 held lengthy and
detailed hearings on them before the Judiciary Committee's Sub
committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.ss These hearings
culminated in House Bill 6, which was introduced in 1977. The
Subcommittee held meetings on House Bill 6, which resulted in a
new version, House Bill 7330, and after further discussions yet an
other version, House Bill 8200. The Judiciary Committee amended
House Bill 8200 and issued a new version, along with a committee
report.s6 Meanwhile, the Subcommittee also prepared a report on
the constitutionality of the proposed bankruptcy courts.s7 The
House debated and amended House Bill 8200 in October 1977, but
because the legislative managers did not approve of this amend
ment - a similar one had been rejected by the Subcommittee they removed the bill from the calendar. The Subcommittee held
S3. See id. at 28. The Commission also made a large number of proposals regarding the
mechanics of bankruptcy and the rights of the parties in bankruptcy; it also made proposals
regarding railroad reorganizations and wage-earner plans. See id. at 9-31.
S4. The bills are printed and compared in Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31
and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights ofthe House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong. app. (197S-1976) [hereinafter 1975-76 House Hearings].
SS. See 1975-76 House Hearings.
S6. See H.R. REP. No. 9S-S9S (1977).
S7. See STAFF OF nm SUBCOMM. ON Civn. AND CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS O F nm HousE
CoMM. ON nm Juo1CIARY, 9STH CoNo., CoNSTITUTIONAL BANKRUPTCY CoURTS (Comm.
Print No. 3, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 HOUSE SUPP. REPORT].
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further hearings58 and released a new report.59 The House debated
House Bill 8200 again in February 1978, reversed the earlier
amendment, and passed the bill by a voice vote.60
The 1977 House Report identified three major problems with
the bankruptcy system: (1) impaired adjudication of cases resulting
from judges' lack of independence and low status; (2) insufficient
relief to consumer debtors; and (3) excessive vagueness.61 To ad
dress these and other problems, House Bill 8200 proposed the fol
lowing changes to the law.

Administrative structure. House Bill 8200 would have abolished
the old referee system. It would have given the new bankruptcy
judges full powers of law, equity, and admiralty, including injunc
tive powers, the power to hold jury trials, contempt power, and ju
risdiction over all matters arising in connection with a bankruptcy
case, with appeal to the circuit courts. The bill also would have
given bankruptcy judges more control over local rulemaking, fi
nances, and so on, so they would not have to defer to district judges,
which was considered demeaning. Bankruptcy judges would have
become Article III judges, with full tenure and advice-and-consent
presidential appointment.62 In addition, the bill would have created
a system of U.S. Trustees, modeled on the U.S. Attorney system.
Trustees would have been autonomous but under the loose supervi
sion of the Department of Justice. They would have had adminis
trative authority over bankruptcy cases.63
Exemptions. House Bill 8200 provided for a $10,000 exemption
for the homestead and $5,000 for personal property, among other
things, but would have given the debtor the right to choose between
the federal and state exemptions - effectively making the federal
exemptions a floor. House Bill 8200 would also have given the
debtor the right to waive judicial liens on exempt property and non
purchase money security interests in household-related exempt
58. See Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings on H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977) [hereinaf
ter 1977 House Supp. Hearings].
59. See SUBCOMMTITEE ON Civn. AND CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 951H CoNG., REPORT ON HEARINGS ON THE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
STRUCTURE FOR BANKRUPTCY CASES (Comm. Print No. 13, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 HousE
REPORT].
60. The main members of staff who worked on and drafted the 1978 Act were Kenneth
Klee and Richard Levin, on the House side, and Robert Feidler and Harry Dixon, on the
Senate side.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4.
62. See id. at 7.
63. See id. at 88.
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property.64 House Bill 8200 would have allowed consumer debtors
to redeem collateral.65
Business reorganizations. House Bill 8200 provided for the con
solidation of the old Chapters X and XI, and it chose as the stan
dard for approval of confirmations a substantially more liberal rule
than the one that prevailed under Chapter X. The debtor would
have had an exclusive 120-day right to propose a plan. The man
agement would presumptively have retained control as the debtor
in possession. The CB, in contrast, made the trustee presumptive
for large, public corporations. Creditors' committees would have
been appointed by the courts.66
Miscellaneous. House Bill 8200 retained the discharge excep
tion for false financial statements. Because it was believed that
creditors sometimes manipulate debtors, however, if a creditor
made this charge but then lost, it had to pay debtors' costs and at
torneys' fees.67 Over significant objections,68 the bill retained the
discharge for educational loans.69 The bill would have prohibited
reaffirmations.10
Meanwhile, in the Senate the CB and the JB had been intro
duced as Senate Bill 236 and Senate Bill 235 in 1975. The Senate
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery conducted hearings.71 No further activity occurred until
1977, when a new bill, Senate Bill 2266, was proposed and hearings
were held.72 After the House passed House Bill 8200, the Subcom
mittee revised Senate Bill 2266 and reported it out to the Judiciary
Committee. The Judiciary Committee voted in favor of the new
Senate Bill 2266 after amending it, and a report was filed.73 After
Senate Bill 2266 traveled through several committees, it came
before the full Senate, which amended it and passed it by a voice
64.

See id. at 126.
See id. at 127.
See id. at 220-31.
See id. at 128-31.
See id. at 536-38 (supplemental views of Rep. Ertel).
See id. at 132-34.
See id. at 365-66.
See The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.
(1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearings].
72. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200 Before the
Subcomm. on Impr9vements in Judicial Machinery ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. (1978) [hereinafter 1977 Senate Hearings] (taking place on Nov. 28-29 and Dec. 1,

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

1977).
73. See S. REP. No. 95-989.
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vote as an amendment in the nature of a substitute to House Bill
8200. Senate Bill 2266 included the following provisions.

Administrative structure. Senate Bill 2266 would have created
less powerful and prestigious bankruptcy judges than House Bill
8200. Bankruptcy judges would have continued as adjuncts of the
district courts. Bankruptcy judges would have been appointed by
the court of appeals for each circuit, rather than by the President,
and would have had a twelve-year tenn.74 Senate Bill 2266 also
would not have created a bankruptcy agency in the executive
branch, instead keeping the trustee system in the judicial branch.75

Exemptions. Senate Bill 2266 followed old law and provided for
the incorporation of state exemptions.76
Business reorganization. Senate Bill 2266 would have consoli
dated Chapters X, XI, and XII, but it left a separate track for public
corporations. Among other things, it provided for mandatory ap
pointment of a trustee in the case of public corporations. It would
have retained the old, strict standard for reorganization of public
corporations, while providing for a standard similar to the House's
for the reorganization of private corporations.
Miscellaneous. Senate Bill 2266 would have retained the fraud
exception to discharge but provided that the debtor is entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs if the creditors' claim of fraud is not
brought in good faith.77 Student loans would have been nondis
chargeable for five years after they were due.78 Debtors would
have had thirty days to rescind a reaffirmation, but after the expira
tion of that period reaffirmations would have been enforceable.79

3. Stage 3
Stage 3 began with an impasse. Congress faced two bills, House
Bill 8200 as originally passed by the House and Senate Bill 2266,
though the latter was now known as House Bill 8200 as amended by
the Senate ("first Senate amendment"). Instead of holding a joint
conference, the managers of the legislation conducted negotiations
and hammered out a deal. The compromise was reflected in the
House's amendment to House Bill 8200, passed in September 1978.
In October the Senate passed the House amendment by a voice
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 17-18.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id. at 79.
See id. at 80-81.
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vote after adding several of its own amendments ("second Senate
amendment"). The House concurred, also by a voice vote, and the
President signed the bill in early November.
The House amendment split the differences between House Bill
The House prevailed on
the transfer of new powers to the bankruptcy judge, but the bank
ruptcy judge would not be an Article ill judge. The Senate pre
vailed in its efforts to prevent the creation of a bankruptcy agency
in the executive branch, but agreed to a limited pilot program to
test the idea. The compromise created a uniform system of federal
exemptions - for example, a $7,500 homestead exemption - but
gave the states the right to opt out. It adopted the House's version
of reorganization law, with two concessions to the Senate: it in
cluded vague provisions designed to create some special protections

8200 and Senate Bill 2266 in several ways.

for cases involving public corporations, and it provided for the au
tomatic appointment of an examiner in such cases, though not of an
independent trustee as the Senate had preferred. Reaffirmations
were to be permitted, but they had to meet disclosure and related
requirements. Numerous other compromises occurred, but we
need not detail them.80
The provisions of the second Senate amendment are strikingly
trivial, but their triviality makes them all the more interesting. The
amendment reduced the bankruptcy judges' authority to hire
clerks, gave the Judicial Council the power to issue "recommenda
tions" of candidates for the appointment of bankruptcy judges,
eliminated the bankruptcy judges' retirement plan, gave the chief
judge of a circuit the power to evaluate certain incumbent bank
ruptcy judges, and even possibly, obscurely, took away the bank
ruptcy judges' hard-won right to be called "judge" rather than
"referee."81 Because of the lateness of the date, the House passed
the second Senate amendment without making further changes.
The second Senate amendment is surprising not only because its
provisions were trivial, but also because it seems ,to have violated
the deal made between the House and the Senate. As we shall see,
the evidence suggests that Senator DeConcini unilaterally made
these changes and told the House that they were non-negotiable.
Rep. Edwards was distressed about these changes but could not
80. For a description of the compromises, see 124 CoNo. REc. 33,992-4,018 (1978) (state
ment of Senator DeConcini). Apparently, there were hundreds of points of disagreement,
but the conflicts over administrative structure and corporate reorganization generated the
most heat. See Telephone Interview with Robert Feidler, Former Counsel to the Senate Judi
ciary Committee (Jan. 13, 1997) [hereinafter Feidler Interview].
81. See 124 CoNG. REc. 34,144-45 (1978) (statement of the Hon. Don Edwards).
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oppose them at the late date. The House passed the second Senate
amendment in early October; the President signed the bill in early
November.82
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Participants in the hearings came into conflict over two major
issues of administrative structure. The first issue concerned the
power and status of the bankruptcy court. Some participants be
lieved that bankruptcy judges should have broader powers than
those they enjoyed under the old law and that they should have
greater status; other participants preferred the old law. Because the
status of a judge depends in part on the extent of his powers, the
questions of power and status were intertwined. The second issue
concerned the nature of the administrative apparatus that would
control the appointment of trustees. Some participants wanted to
create a "bankruptcy agency" in the executive branch; other partici
pants wanted to keep the appointment of trustees in the judicial
branch.
Recall that the Senate bill to create a Bankruptcy Commission
contemplated that bankruptcy judges would serve on the Commis
sion, but that the final law created slots only for appointments from
the executive branch, the Senate, the House, and the federal judici
ary. The bankruptcy judges' exclusion from the Commission re
sulted from the objections of the federal judiciary. During the
initial hearings before the Senate in 1968 Judge Weinfeld, speaking
for the Judicial Conference of the United States, said:

Here the proposal is that referees be included as well as lawyers,
but the fact is that the ultimate judgment with respect to bankruptcy
matters is made by judges of the court who review the various actions
of referees when petitions for review are presented.
. . . You must bear in mind that the experts [i.e., referees] have
points of view reflecting at times their separate interest
I don't
mean this special interest in any invidious sense - but men some
times become wedded to their particular ideas. It would seem to me
that the Commission that we propose [i.e., without referees] would be
more concerned with broad-gaged policies . . . s3
-

.

82. Apparently, the bill was held up by the Speaker of the House because either he or
powerful representatives wanted to prevent the reappointment of a certain bankruptcy judge
in Connecticut The transition provisions provided that all sitting judges at the time of enact
ment would be automatically reappointed; the Connecticut judge's term expired after the
House voted and before the President signed. See Telephone Interview with Kenneth N.
Klee, Former Associate Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee (Jan. 29, 1997) [hereinaf
ter Klee Interview]; see also Feidler Interview, supra note 80.
83. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 63 (testimony of Judge Edward Weinfeld}.
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Weinfeld's argument was flimsy. No doubt bankruptcy judges had a
"separate interest," but so did everyone else involved in bankruptcy
reform. Bankruptcy judges knew more than anyone else about the
bankruptcy system, and the oddity of excluding them from the
Commission was obvious enough to others - no testifying party
outside the federal judiciary seconded Weinfeld's views.84 But his
views nonetheless prevailed.ss
The most likely reason that the federal judiciary opposed the
participation of bankruptcy judges on the Commission is that it
feared that bankruptcy judges would use their influence on the
Commission to press for a bankruptcy law that would transfer
power and status from the federal judiciary to the bankruptcy
judges. Bankruptcy judges had long made clear to the federal judi
ciary their dissatisfaction with their subordinate status, lobbying the
federal judges for more autonomy, fancier titles, greater privileges,
and the right to participate in judicial policymaking and administra
tion. They felt most keenly their exclusion from the Judicial Con
ference, the judicial branch's policymaking body. Judge Weinfeld
did not admit the motives of the federal judges, of course; but we
will see shortly evidence that the federal judiciary's most passionate
concern about bankruptcy reform was that the status of federal
judges would be diluted by an increase in the power of bankruptcy
judges. The House and Senate yielded to the federal judges' objec
tions to the participation of bankruptcy judges on the Commis
sion,86 probably because they believed that the success of any
legislative deal would depend on the judges' cooperation both dur
ing legislation and when the statute entered litigation.
The federal judges' victory was short lived. The Commission ar
gued that bankruptcy judges' low status hampered their efforts to
adjudicate bankruptcy disputes in a fair and expeditious manner.
The solution to this problem was "to enhance the real and apparent
judicial independence of bankruptcy judges."87 One route to en84. For a rejoinder from a bankruptcy judge, see 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54,
at 229-34 (reprinting Conrad K. Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revi
sion of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 103-08 (1975)).
85. Justice Burger was entitled to fill his slots with bankruptcy judges, but he resisted the
pressure of the bankruptcy judges to do so and appointed two federal district judges. See
KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 47.
86. It is generally understood that the House and Senate changed the representation on
the Commission in order to appease the federal judges rather than for some other purpose.
See Feidler Interview, supra note 80.
87. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 95 (1973); see also KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 52 (observ
ing that the CB "elevated the stature and the prestige of the [bankruptcy] court and assimi
lated the procedures to the procedures of the federal district court").
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hancement would occur through modification of appointment, ten
ure, and compensation. The CB would have made bankruptcy
judges subject to presidential appointment with the advice and con
sent of the Senate, increased their tenure from six to fifteen years,
and increased their compensation. The other route to enhancement
of status would occur through modification of the role of the bank
ruptcy judge, so that the judge would have fewer "administrative"
and more "judicial" responsibilities - the theory being that admin
istrative actions dissipated the cloud of impartiality that otherwise
enhanced the prestige of the judge. In pursuit of these aims the CB
would have reduced bankruptcy judges' administrative responsibili
ties, expanded their jurisdiction, and increased their remedial
powers.88
Judge Weinfeld - now on the Commission - rejected the
Commission's argument in a separate statement and maintained
that the existing system worked adequately, that bankruptcy judges'
powers should not be changed, and that the appointment process
should remain in the hands of the district judges, although perhaps
tenure should be increased to twelve years.89 He lost on all these
issues. However, he and the other judge on the Commission, Hu
bert Will, prevailed on the other members of the Commission not
to propose that the bankruptcy judgeship be made an Article III
position.90
Before identifying the sources of this conflict, let me mention
the Commission's second major proposal regarding administrative
reform. The Commission proposed the establishment of an entirely
new independent agency in the executive branch, to be called "The
United States Bankruptcy Administration." The Administrator
would be a presidential appointee, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, and would have a seven-year term. The Administration
would take over the functions of the trustee and the administrative
functions of the bankruptcy judge, and it would offer counseling
services to debtors in consumer cases.91 Judge Weinfeld did not ob
ject to this proposal in his statement, but later, during the hearings,
the federal judges and the bankruptcy judges would object to it.
Why did the majority of the Commission support the enhance
ment of the independence and prestige of the bankruptcy courts,
while Judge Weinfeld opposed it? Why did the Commission sup88. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 85-96.
89. See id. at 299-301 (separate statement of Judge Edward Weinfeld).
90. See KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 52.
91. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 117-53.
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port the creation of a bankruptcy agency while the bankruptcy
judges opposed it? Looking beyond the parties' statements and at
their interests, it appears that the proposed administrative structure
reflected concerns about maintaining and expanding power, espe
cially the power of patronage.
Seven of the nine members of the Commission came from the
executive and legislative branches, both of which had an interest in
creating new patronage opportunities. The bankruptcy courts de
scribed in the CB would have served this interest by (1) transferring
the appointment power from the judicial branch to the legislative
and executive branches, and (2) making the position of bankruptcy
judge more attractive to candidates and thus a more valuable cur
rency for repaying political debts. The creation of a bankruptcy
agency would have served the executive and legislative branches'
interest in patronage opportunities by creating one advice-and
consent position and countless subsidiary positions, to be filled by
political allies.
The federal judges opposed the creation of more independent
bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their appointment
power over bankruptcy judges, and thus one of their main pa
tronage opportunities, and (2) their status would be diluted through
the vast increase in the number of federal judicial positions. The
federal judges also opposed the creation of the bankruptcy agency,
because to the extent th8:t the agency would deprive bankruptcy
judges of the power to appoint trustees and to the extent to which
the bankruptcy judges were within the control of the federal judges,
the creation of the bankruptcy agency would reduce the power and
independence of the judiciary.
The bankruptcy judges supported the enhancement of the
power and prestige of the bankruptcy courts, because they would
gain power, status, and possibly pecuniary compensation. Bank
ruptcy judges had for a long time complained about what they saw
as their low status,92 and they saw bankruptcy reform as an oppor
tunity to solve this problem. Said one observer about the JB: "I
92. See 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 227-28 (testimony of Attorney Gen
eral Bell); 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 539 (statement of Harold Marsh, Jr.,
Former Chairman, Commission of Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, claiming that
bankruptcy judges "resent their status as being subordinated to and depende[nt] upon the
Federal District Court"). Here is an example of the issues at stake:
We think that it is demeaning and unbecoming for a district judge to enact a local rule
requiring that any fee in excess of a rather minimal amount, $200, must be passed before
the district judge for approval before it can be allowed, remembering that he has had
nothing whatsoever to do with this case.
. . If there is a major, serious contempt that involves something more and requiring
something more than a fine of $200, it has got to be transferred and certified to a district
•
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think the Judges' bill is the result of the fact that these are judges
and they want to be judges and judges' judges and this accounts for
what is in the Judges' bill, the need for status. "93 Although the CB
would not have enhanced the bankruptcy judges' status and power
as much as the JB - in particular, the latter would have made ap
peal to the circuit court, bypassing the district court, in effect treat
ing bankruptcy courts and district courts as equals94 - it did
enough to garner the bankruptcy judges' support in this respect.
The bankruptcy judges, however, opposed the creation of the
bankruptcy agency. One judge testified:

My view is that a national corporate trustee will be the framework
for another huge bureaucracy with tentacles reaching into every area
of the country and marked with all the weaknesses of inept official
ism, expensive red tape and corruption inducing proliferation [sic] .
This last consideration is vital for the temptation and the opportunity
for corruption will be unlimited.95
A more plausible explanation for the bankruptcy judges' opposition
to the bankruptcy agency is that the latter would have deprived
them of their main source of patronage - the power to appoint
judge. We feel that is totally inappropriate and tends to weaken the respect that litigants
and l awyers should entertain for the bankruptcy court.
1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 153 (testimony of Bankruptcy Judge Robert B.
Morton, President, National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges). Here is another:
While H.R. 31, the Commission Bill, strongly favors the elevation and independence of
the new court there is one aspect of their proposal that is seriously flawed and, in fact,
works against their own goal of enhancing the status and dignity of the new court. I
refer to the H.R. 31 provision that clerks of the bankruptcy court be appointed from
among the clerks ofthe district court with the concurrence ofthe district judges. That kind
of hybridization would be as damaging as it is unnecessary and inconsistent. Any in
dependent court worthy of the name must h ave a clear, unblurred line of authority to its
own clerks.
ld. at 513 (statement of Bankruptcy Judge Robert B. Morton) (footnote omitted). Here is a
third:
[T]he bankruptcy referees were certainly regarded at a different level from district
judges [during the early post-World War II years]. In my early visits for meetings at
Foley Square, the referees did not sit at tables with the district judges and, I believe, did
not ride the same elevators. My recollection is that the referees didn't even h ave their
names on their doors, but I'm not positive about that.
KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 32-33.
93. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 869 (testimony of Phillip Shuchman, Law
Professor, University of Connecticut) (emphasis added).
94. The CB would h ave made the bankruptcy judge a presidential appointment, whereas
the JB would have kept the appointment of the bankruptcy judge within the judicial branch.
The CB's provision thus would h ave given power to the executive branch and the Senate; the
bankruptcy judges may h ave believed that they had more influence over judicial appoint
ments, or else they were trying to mollify the federal judges. The JB also would have ex
panded some of the administrative powers placed within the judicial branch. See 1975-76
House Hearings, supra note 54, at app.
95. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 112 (quoting Bankruptcy Judge Asa S. Herzog); see also
Levin & Klee, supra note 28, at 3.
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trustees from their acquaintances in the local bankruptcy bar.96 As
a bankruptcy judge (and his clerk) wrote after the enactment of the
bankruptcy bill, "Judicial appointment of a trustee is common, par
ticularly in nominal asset cases filed by individual debtors. The
court-appointed trustee is often understandably a personal friend of
the judge who serves in a number of cases before that judge at a
given ·time."97 The bonds of friendship are strong indeed.
If the patronage motives were half hidden in the Commission
Report and related documents, they became clearer during the
hearings in Stage 2. The federal judges, who had earlier resisted the
bankruptcy judges' efforts to have their title changed from "refe
ree" to "bankruptcy judge," apparently on the grounds that such a
change would dilute the prestige of the title "judge,"98 reiterated
their opposition to elevation of the bankruptcy judges and to the
creation of a bankruptcy agency.99 Again, the federal judges could
not admit that their motive was a fear of a loss of prestige, but a
former judge made this rationale explicit:

[A] significant increase in the number of Article III judges, contem
plated by [House Bill 8200], would dilute the significance, and pres
tige, of district judgeships. Prestige is a very important factor in
96. Such patronage - or at least its "appearance" - was widely acknowledged. See, e.g.,
Hearings, supra note 72, at 1082 (statement of Margerie Girth, Law Professor,
State University of New York at Buffalo, and David T. Stanley, consultant); H.R. REP. No.
95-595, at 92 (1977) ("Some judges view the trustee's job as a patronage position for the
bankruptcy judge to dispense; the judge may even let it be known that elections are not
viewed with favor."); 124 CONG. REc. 32,419 {1978) (remarks of Rep. Butler).

1977 Senate

97. John J. Galgay & Kenneth H. Eckstein, Case Administration Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act: The United States Trustee Program, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw
151, 152 {William J. Norton, Jr. ed., 1979) {footnote omitted).
98. This is generally known, but there is a reference to the controversy in 1977 House
Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 192-93 (testimony of Judge David Kline, President, Na
tional Conference of Bankruptcy Judges).
99. See 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 112-17 (statement of Judge Wesley
E. Brown, Judicial Conference); id. at 128-32 (statement of Judge Edward Weinfeld, Judicial
Conference); id. at 154-58 (response of Judge Wesley E. Brown to list of questions); 1975-76
House Hearings, supra note 54, at 5-6, 14-173 (statement and testimony of Berkeley Wright,
Chief, Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts); id. at 20-21 (H. Kent
Presson, Assistant Chief, Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
The third document shows the judges seeking to keep the bankruptcy judges' powers and
employment benefits below those of Article III district judges in every way: from a lower
salary to denial of membership in the judicial conference. Cf. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra
note 72, at 413 (testimony of Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert) {observing that all judges who con
sidered this question (two circuits did not) unanimously opposed Article III status for bank
ruptcy courts: "I would like to emphasize . . . that it is very unusual to get a group of [f]ederal
judges to agree on anything
But I think it is very significant that . . . there was unanimity
in the Judicial Conference
"). It is important to emphasize that Justice Burger was not
acting on his own, as is sometimes claimed, but was acting on behalf of the entire federal
judiciary. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Conference and the New Bankruptcy Act, 65
A.B.A. J. 229 (1979).
.

.

•

.

•

•

.

•

80

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

96:47

attracting highly qualified men and women to the federal bench, from
more lucrative pursuits.
. . . The benefits which might flow from increasing the prestige of
that post [of bankruptcy judge] would be far outweighed by the dan
gers brought by a loss of prestige of federal district judgeships.100
In addition to the evidence that the judges feared losing status,
there emerged evidence that they feared losing the patronage
power to appoint bankruptcy judges.101 One must admit the possi
bility that the federal judges were right on policy grounds, but if
they had been, one would have expected some support for their
views from outside the judicial branch. Almost no one - creditors,
debtors, or lawyers - expressed such support.102
Stage 2 also saw the bankruptcy judges reiterating their support
for higher status bankruptcy courts and their opposition to the crea
tion of a federal bankruptcy agency.103 Evidence of the bankruptcy
judges' practice of appointing cronies to the position of trustee sup
ports the hypothesis that the bankruptcy judges opposed the bank
ruptcy agency because they feared losing their patronage power.
Some observers suggested the existence of a "bankruptcy ring,"
consisting of the local bankruptcy bar and bankruptcy judges who
favored each other over outsiders.104 The bankruptcy judges de100. 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 9 (statement of former {district) Judge
H. Rifkind).
101. Consider the following exchange:

Simon

Mr. McClory. One very good reason why district judges don't want to change the
system, I think we must recognize, is that they enjoy appointing the referees, and they
enjoy appointing special masters, too.
Judge Rifkind. Maybe they do.
1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 50; see also 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note
72, at 514-15 (testimony of Stanford Lerch, former Trustee).

102. The major exception is the Attorney General. See infra text accompanying notes
117-21.
103. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 512-16 (statement of Bankruptcy
Judge Robert B. Morton).

104.

According to one report:
As a result of the nature of the system itself, there exists a relationship between the
Bankruptcy Judges, the trustees and the counsel for the trustees which many people,
including many involved in the system, consider unhealthy from the point of view of
proper judicial and governmental administration. The judges by and large appoint the
trustees and thereby in effect select the counsel. They do not generally appoint persons
who are total strangers to them, and it would be entirely unrealistic to expect that they
would or should. These same trustees and lawyers then deal on a day-to-day basis with
the judge regarding the routine conduct of the proceeding, and finally these same trust
ees and lawyers appear before the judge as litigants and counsel when a controversy
arises.
As a result of the conditions discussed above, and I am sure for other reasons, there
grew up over the years an isolation of the bankruptcy bench and bar from the main
stream of American jurisprudence and from the judiciary and the legal fraternity gener
ally. Persons practicing in the bankruptcy field tended to confine their activities
exclusively to that area, and the Bankruptcy Court, of course, did so from necessity.
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nied these allegations, arguing that defects in the system resulted
from their lack of power, not from their abuse of it. They reiterated
their view that their powers should be broadened, that an agency
should not be created, and that they should continue to have the
power to appoint trustees.ms
The hypothesis that Congress saw an opportunity to increase its
patronage powers by seizing appointment powers from the courts
receives support from the following exchange between Representa
tive Butler and Attorney General Bell regarding the question of
who should appoint bankruptcy judges:
Mr. Butler. Selection by the President of the United States of
bankruptcy judges? Would that disturb you? By the President?
General Bell. It would not. It would be a little different from
what we're doing now, I guess - we're doing it the same way. We
have a lot of these appointments.
As you know, I've been having a lot of problems with U.S. attor
neys. That seems to be a big problem in selecting judges. I guess it's
more political.
. . . You might be charged with giving the party in power more
patronage. You have to recognize, if you have a system where the
Judicial Council, or even the district judge recommending to the Judi
cial Council, that they be selected, you have less of a political system.
Because some judges are Democrats, some are Republicans.
If you want to give it all to Democrats, we'd - we, being in power
right now, I guess I couldn't object to it.
Mr. Butler. Patronage is a "burden" of power, I think, in my
observation.
[Laughter.]
General Bell. It is a burden, I think. It really is that. I wouldn't
quarrel with you if you think that's the way to do it.106

Bell's initial point was that appointments by the executive and legis
lative branches are seen as political, because all of the appoint
ments are made by the party in power. Appointments by the
judicial branch are not as controversial, because judges belong to
Therefore, a relatively small group of lawyers controlled the bankruptcy field. Those not
within this group tended to regard them with suspicion and distrust
1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 538 (statement of Harold Marsh, Jr., former chair
man of the Bankruptcy Commission), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 95-96 (1977); see
also id. at 25 (testimony of H. Kent Presson, Assistant Chief, Bankruptcy Division, Adminis
trative Office of the U.S. Courts); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 95; KENNEDY, supra note 45, at
37 (describing the bankruptcy ring); Anne Colamosca, The Bankruptcy Hustle, THE NEW
REPUBuc, Feb. 17, 1979, at 15.
105. See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 587-88, 592-93 (statement and testi
mony of George M. Treister, Vice Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference).
106. 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 228-29 (testimony of Attorney Gen
eral Griffin B. Bell}.
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different parties. Bell apparently had disliked the political contro
versies that engulfed the Justice Department because of its role in
the appointment of U.S. Attorneys, and, as we shall see, probably
feared having to deal with similar controversies if the President
were given the power to appoint bankruptcy judges because the
Justice Department would have a role in those appointments as
well. But he was forced to concede Butler's point which, though
sarcastically made, must have been clear to everyone in the room
(hence the laughter): the creation of opportunities for patronage
benefits the party in power.
Lawyers, as noted, generally supported the creation of the
higher status bankruptcy courts and opposed the creation of a
bankruptcy agency, but they were divided in some respects. Com
mercial lawyers and bankruptcy lawyers strongly supported the cre
ation of independent bankruptcy courts.101 One reason for their
support was that in districts where the bankruptcy judge did not use
the trustee position as a source of patronage, the bankruptcy law
yers used it as a source of profit:
Frequently, an attorney that has represented a creditor in past cases
will notify him of the bankruptcy of one of the creditor's current debt
ors. The attorney then obtains a proxy from the creditor to vote the
creditor's interest in the case. An attorney may obtain numerous
proxies in a particular case in this manner. When the trustee is to be
elected, the attorney votes all of his proxies for a colleague. The col
league thus elected then hires the attorney to serve as counsel to the
trustee in the case, assuring a fee for th[ese] services. The fee for
counsel is usually substantially higher than the fee for the trustee, be
cause it is not limited to a specified percentage under the Bankruptcy
Act. In a subsequent case, the colleague and the attorney will switch
places.108

By electing each other as the trustee and hiring each other as the
trustee's counsel, bankruptcy lawyers assured themselves a steady
source of business and a steady source of profit.
Another reason that commercial and bankruptcy lawyers sup
ported the enhancement of the status of bankruptcy courts is that
lawyers, like bankruptcy judges, care about prestige; just as it is
more prestigious to argue in front of federal courts than to argue in
front of state courts, so would it be more prestigious to argue in
107. See, e.g., id., at 77 (statement of Louis W. Levit, Chairman, Special Committee on
the Bankruptcy Act, Commercial Law League of America); id. at 238 (National Bankruptcy
Conference); 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1538.
108. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 92 (citing 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 125253 (statement of John Honsberger, Canadian attorney) (discussing corrupt practices in
Canada)).
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front of high-status bankruptcy courts than to argue in front of low
status bankruptcy courts. Shortly after World War II "bankruptcy
lawyers were generally regarded as second-class members of the
profession, they were not regarded with the same respect as civil
lawyers."109 Frank Kennedy, the drafter of the CB, ingenuously de
scribes how he and the National Bankruptcy Commission worked
to enhance the stature of the bankruptcy bar by trying to effect
changes in the law - for example, merging the bankruptcy rules
and the federal rules of civil procedure in order to make civil cases
in the district court and civil cases in the bankruptcy court as similar
as possible.110 So deeply ingrained was their desire for respect, the
bankruptcy lawyers did not see the enhancement of the prestige of
the bankruptcy court as a controversial project, or that changing the
law to that end might actually make the law worse.
Lawyers as a class were less enthusiastic about the proposed ad
ministrative changes but were generally supportive.111 They, like
the federal judges, may have feared that an increase in the power of
bankruptcy judges would lead to a general dilution of the status of
the federal courts and thus a dilution of the status of lawyers prac
ticing in federal courts. To the members of the American Bar Asso
ciation this danger must have seemed minimal: they probably
believed sensibly that an increase in the status of bankruptcy judges
would not dilute the status of federal judges by much. But even so,
this loss would hit hardest lawyers who specialized in nonban
kruptcy trial work and who thus depended to an unusual degree on
the status of the federal courts for their own status. These lawyers
did oppose the creation of independent bankruptcy courts.112
Lawyers unanimously opposed the creation of a bankruptcy
agency, particularly the proposal that it have the role of counseling
consumer debtors. The lawyers argued that the agency would "de
stroy the private consumer bankruptcy bar" and create a "monop
oly of lay counselors."113 The talk of "monopoly" is, of course, just
109. KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 32.
110. See KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 33; see also id. at 55 ("(Because of the 1978 Act,] I
think, generally, there has been an elevation or improvement of the status of the bankruptcy
court and the status of bankruptcy law and bankruptcy administration
That's been my
life-long objective, and I think it has been achieved in an important measure.").
111. The American Bar Association favored a longer transition period and more studies.
See 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 2 (statement of L. Stanley Chauvin, Jr.,
Chairman, Task Force on Revision of Bankruptcy Laws, American Bar Association).
112. See id. at 8-10 (statement of Judge Simon H. Rifkind, American College of Trial
Lawyers).
113. See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1269, 1270 (testimony of George Rit
ner, California attorney).
.

.
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talk: the lay counselors would be government agents, not employ
ees of a single private enterprise. The lawyers objected to the pro
posal to give the bankruptcy agency the role of counseling
consumer debtors because that role threatened a source of business
for the lawyers. In addition, the federalization of the trustee system
would have reduced the ability of locally influential bankruptcy
lawyers to use their connections to obtain the position of trustee or
to get themselves hired by the trustee. Lawyers who frequently ac
ted as trustees supported the elevation of the status of bankruptcy
courts while opposing the establishment of a bankruptcy agency114
- in both cases consistently with their interests, narrowly
understood.
The creditors generally supported increasing the independence
of bankruptcy courts, just because they hoped that higher-status
courts would attract better judges and that more powerful bank
ruptcy courts would be less vulnerable to reversal by higher courts
and attendant delays.11s They opposed the creation of the bank
ruptcy agency, at least partly because they feared that such an
agency would encourage consumers to enter bankruptcy.116
The Department of Justice opposed the creation of independent
bankruptcy judges and a bankruptcy agency. Attorney General
Bell argued that bankruptcy judges should remain adjuncts of the
district court, and that, although an official trustee was a good idea,
he or she should be placed in the judicial branch.117 Bell opposed a
proposal that the trustees be placed in the Department of Justice
rather than in a separate bankruptcy agency, arguing that if the
trustees were in the Justice Department, this would create conflict
of interest problems, because in many cases the Justice Department
114. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 495 (testimony of Irving Sulmeyer,
Trustee).
115. See 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 194-96 (statement of John W.
Ingraham, Vice President, Citibank Corp., and member, Robert Morris Associates Task
Force on Bankruptcy); id. at 208 (testimony of George Wade, attorney, Robert Morris Asso·
ciates Task Force on Bankruptcy); id. at '1:37 (testimony of Attorney General Bell} ("I have
been a bank lawyer off and on all my life, and I'll guarantee you that the bank would have
more confidence with the district judge handling the bankruptcy cases than they would under
the present system."); see also 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 862 (statement of John
Creedon, Executive Vice President, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.).
116. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1028-29 (testimony of Walter W.
Vaughan, Vice President, American Security Bank, and Chairman, American Bankers Asso·
ciation and Consumer Bankers Association Task Force on Bankruptcy); id. at 1044-45 (state·
ment of Walter Ray Phillips, Household Finance Corporation, and Associate Dean & Law
Professor, University of Georgia); id. at 1361 (statement of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Chairman,
Subcommittee on Bankruptcy, National Consumer F"mance Association).
117. See 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, at 215-19 (statement of Attorney
General Bell}.
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would then both represent a creditor (the United States) and par
ticipate in the administration of the debtor's estate.118 Bell also ar
gued that the existing bankruptcy system worked well, and that as
long as bankruptcy judges were given sufficient resources, it was not
necessary to confer more status on them. Both of Bell's arguments
were reasonable, and possibly candid,119 but other statements he
made suggest that the Justice Department, which already managed
the President's appointment of federal judges, did not want the ad
ditional burden of managing the President's appointment of bank
ruptcy judges.120 This was the tenor of the passage quoted above, in
which Bell lamented his involvement in political controversies over
the appointment of U.S. Attorneys.121 If this conjecture is correct,
he would probably not have wanted the additional burden of man
aging the trustee system, either. The Justice Department opposed
the proposed changes most likely because it would have had to bear
the administrative and political costs arising from its role in ap
pointments while gaining no benefits or benefits of uncertain value.
The House Hearings led to a bill that greatly expanded the pa
tronage powers of the executive and legislative branches of the fed
eral government. House Bill 8200 endorsed the idea of the stronger
bankruptcy courts, indeed in many respects going beyond the provi
sions of the JB and the CB. Most significant, House Bill 8200
would have created Article ill bankruptcy judges, with life tenure.
The House Report argued that it was necessary as a matter of pol
icy to increase the power and status of bankruptcy judges, but this
could not be done under Article ill of the Constitution unless the
judges were given life tenure. This argument was plausible but not
decisive, given the state of constitutional theory at the time.122 The
House Report rejected proposals to leave bankruptcy judges as ad
juncts of the district court, and it rejected proposals to turn them
into Article I judges. In addition, House Bill 8200 gave the bank118. See id. at 218-19.
119. It appears that the trustee system has not raised problems relating to conflict of
interest, so Bell's argument may not have been a frank one, though we have the advantage of
hindsight Cf. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat 3088 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 & 28 u.s.c. {1994)); H.R. REP. No. 99-764, at 17-20 {1986); GENERAL GOVT. DIV., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. GAO/GGD-92-133, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION:
JuSTiflCATION LACKING FOR Two PARALLEL PROGRAMS, at 15-16 {1992).
120. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 553 (agreeing that presidential appoint
ment of bankruptcy judges would be a "substantial burden" for the Justice Department).
121. See supra text accompanying note 106.
122. See 1977 HousE SUPP. REPORT, supra note 57; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 21-39
{1977).
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ruptcy judges broad jurisdictional and remedial powers and pro
vided that appeal from a bankruptcy order would be to the circuit
court.123 This last provision was particularly unattractive to the fed
eral judges, because it seemed to put the bankruptcy courts on par
with the district courts. House Bill 8200 also followed the Commis
sion's recommendation and created a federal bankruptcy agency,
but put the agency in the Department of Justice. The administrator
would be an appointment of the Attorney General.124
Although Senate Bill 2266 gave bankruptcy judges new powers,
duties, and privileges (including the right to appoint their own
clerks), it did not go so far as the House bill. Senate Bill 2266 did
not turn bankruptcy judges into Article III judges, but it did in
crease their terms from six to twelve years. The power to appoint
bankruptcy judges was transferred from district courts to courts of
appeal. Administrative functions remained in the judicial branch.
No federal bankruptcy agency was to be created.125 The overall ef
fect was to raise the independence and status of the bankruptcy
judges slightly, but not by nearly as much as under House Bill 8200,
and to prevent the shift of patronage power from the judiciary to
the legislative and executive branches and from the local level to
the national level.
The hypothesis that the House's bill126 was motivated by con
cerns about patronage should be examined in greater detail.127 It
123. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 21-52.
124. See id. at 99-115.
125. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 144-59 (1978).
126. It should be pointed out that the House was not itself unanimous on the status of
bankruptcy courts. When H.R. 8200 reached the floor of the House, two representatives
proposed an amendment demoting the bankruptcy judge from Article III judge back to ad
junct to the district court and eliminating the bankruptcy agency. The amendment passed by
a vote of 183 to 158. See Bankruptcy Revision Bin 33 CoNo. Q. ALMANAC 571, 571-72
(1977). A few months later, after various parliamentary maneuvers, further hearings, see
1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58, and an additional report, see 1978 HousB RE.
PORT, supra note 59, the amendment was defeated by a vote of 146 to 262. Republicans
voted 67-73; Democrats voted 79-189. See Congress Approves New Bankruptcy System,
supra note 41, at 179, 8"H. The lack of unanimity among the Democrats, and especially the
tendency of Southern Democrats to side with the Republicans (43 voted against, 40 for),
suggest that ideology may have played some role. According to Klee, the original amend
ment was caused by Justice Burger's lobbying. See Klee Interview, supra note 82. On this
point, see infra text accompanying notes 137-141.

127. Klee, Levin, and Feidler disagree with the patronage theory. Although Klee be
lieves that federal judges and bankruptcy judges exercised patronage prior to the 1978 Act,
see Kenneth N. Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 64 A.B.A. J, 1865, 1866 (1978), he
thinks that the transfer of power to the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government was motivated by the desire to break up the old patronage system and not by the
desire to create a new one. See Klee Interview, supra note 82; see also Feidler Interview,
supra note 80; Telephone Interview with Richard Levin, Former Associate Counsel to the
House Judiciary Committee (Apr. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Levin Interview].
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is, of course, possible that the House believed that increasing the
prestige of bankruptcy judges served the public interest, or, more
likely, federal judges did not have as much influence - on House
members as did all the interest groups - creditors, lawyers, bank
ruptcy judges - that supported the enhancement of the bankruptcy
court's prestige. The patronage hypothesis, however, receives sup
port from a recent article, which provides evidence that expansion
of the federal judiciary is likely to occur only when the Presidency,
the House, and the Senate are controlled by a single political party
at the time that the authorizing legislation is passed, and the Presi
dency and the Senate are controlled by the same party when the
nominations and confirmations occur.128 The authors argue that ex
pansion of the federal judiciary occurs during political alignment
because expansion offers the controlling party an opportunity to ap
point judges who share its political views and to dilute the influence
of the sitting judges who do not.129 Although this argument is a
plausible explanation for the subject of the study - the appoint
ment of Supreme Court justices and federal appellate judges - it is
unlikely that Congress cares much about the political views of
bankruptcy judges. An alternative hypothesis is that when political
alignment exists, Congress creates new judicial positions in part be
cause these new positions can be used for patronage. When House
Bill 8200 reached the floor, the Democrats had captured the Presi
dency as well as the House and the Senate, so the conditions were
ripe for judicial expansion. Indeed, in the same year that the 1978
Act was passed Congress also passed the Omnibus Judgeship Act of
1978, which created 35 federal appellate positions and 117 district
court positions, considerably more than Congress had ever created
before, and the first new positions since the last political alignment
in the late 1960s.130 One commentator called the Omnibus Judge128. See John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis ofExpansion ofthe Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. &
EcoN. 435 (1996). The article shows that for Supreme Court justices and federal appellate
judges, political alignment is a significant factor in the timing of expansions, and that both
political alignment and caseload pressures are significant factors in the size of the expansions.
Other variables - increasing caseloads, requests from within the judiciary, budgetary growth
- are not correlated with the timing of judicial expansion at a statistically significant level.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 448-49 tbl.3 (describing statistics for appellate courts). Statistics for district
courts can be found in .ANALYnCAL SERvs. OmCE & STATISTICS DIV., ADMINIS1RATIVE
OmCE OF nm U.S. CoURTS, HISTORY OF FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS 28-29 tbl.B (undated}.
It is true that new bankruptcy positions were created in 1984, when government had be
come divided; so were appellate court positions. But this is just one counterexample: the
authors claim statistically significant, not perfect, correlation.
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ship Act a transfer to the President of "the largest block of judicial
patronage in the nation's history." 131
One might object that Congress did not so much create new
bankruptcy court positions as improve old ones; but because ex
isting bankruptcy judges had no right to reappointment after their
terms expired, Congress would have the opportunity to exercise its
new patronage power. The crucial points are that Congress shifted
the appointment power to the executive and legislative branches,
and it increased the desirability of the positions, making them more
valuable as currency for paying off political debts. If constitutional
considerations required Article ID status for bankruptcy judges, as
further hearings suggested, 132 then so be it. Recall that the Com
mission members other than the judges sought to create Article III
positions.133
A similar argument can be made about the bankruptcy agency.
The agency would require appointments, and these appointments
could be used for patronage purposes. Detailed reasons for putting
the bankruptcy agency in the Department of Justice are not given in
the House Report - there was only a vague reference to the simi
lar functions of trustees and U.S. Attomeys.134 One possibility is
that this proposal retains most of the patronage opportunities cre
ated by the Commission proposal, but the agency, buried in the De
partment of Justice rather than standing on its own, would not be
quite as obviously an expansion of the executive branch.135 In fact,
the drafters of the compromise legislation providing for the pilot
program chose districts in states represented by influential senators
on the Judiciary Committee precisely for the purpose of giving
them a patronage interest in the new appointments, and thus a mo
tive for supporting an expansion of the pilot program into a perma
nent program at a later date.136 We will see that the U.S. Trustee
system would be used for patronage purposes almost immediately
after its creation.
131. See Alan Berlow, Carter Gets Patronage Plum of152 Judges, 36 CoNo Q. WKLY.
REP., at 2961, 2961 (1978).
132. See 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58.
.

133. A possible objection to the patronage theory is the transition provisions of the bills,
which delayed appointment for several years. If Congress was eager to increase its patronage
power, why did it delay its ability to exercise that power until a time at which the old political
alignment might no longer exist? The answer is probably that it would have been impractical
to fire all the bankruptcy judges and replace them immediately.
134. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 100, 109-11 {1977).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
136. See Levin Interview, supra note 127.
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But if these arguments were true, one would expect the Senate
to have supported these proposals. After all, under the House bill
the Senate retained advice and consent powers over the appoint
ment of bankruptcy judges, and one would expect the Senate's pa
tronage privileges with respect to federal judges would have
extended to bankruptcy judges. One possible source of the Sen
ate's resistance is that senators believed that they would have to
share some of this patronage power with House members, and the
value of patronage appointments to the federal bench - a power
enjoyed by senators, not by representatives - would have dimin
ished as a result of the dilution of the federal judiciary.137 Another
reason for the Senate's objections to House Bill 8200 may have
been that the Senate feared a transfer of power from the states,
from which senators draw their power, to the President. This is
consistent with the view that the Senate tends to support the inter
ests of smaller states, which have disproportionate power in the
Senate, over the larger states, which have more power in the House
and the Presidency. A third and related reason is that many sena
tors were ideologically committed to states' rights and populism,
both of which opposed further centralization of authority in the fed
eral government. A fourth reason is that most federal judges have
powerful connections in the Senate, but not in the House: these
connections are indeed the source of their appointments. An old
political debt may not be fully discharged by an appointment to the
federal judiciary - that is the problem with a barter economy. A
sense of obligation may thus linger. Justice Burger had powerful
connections in the Senate - in particular, Strom Thurmond - but
did not have such connections in the House.138 Moreover, the ur
ban interest groups that had so much influence in the House creditors and lawyers, especially - had less influence in the Senate.
So although the Senate supported some increase in the status of
bankruptcy judges, it had many reasons for objecting to an increase
large enough to injure their federal judiciary franchise; and the Sen137. Federal appellate and district judges are generally chosen by senators from states in
the relevant circuit. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CoNGRESS 247-48 (4th ed.
1991). Historically, the President has traded his patronage power for legislative support. See
id. at 248-66, 549-51; RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LmECAP, THE FEDERAL Civrr. SER
VICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 16 (1994).
138. See Levin Interview, supra note 127. Participants in the drafting emphasize the im
portance of the ideological commitments of senators who held crucial positions (Wallop,
Eastland), see Feidler Interview, supra note 80; Klee Interview, supra note 82; but these ex
planations have limited explanatory value. If these senators opposed federal power to such
an extent that they resisted the creation of Article III bankruptcy judges, why did they at the
same time permit the creation of a huge number of traditional Article III judgeships?

90

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:47

ate opposed the creation of a bankruptcy agency, because this pro
posal would have transferred a great deal of local power to the
federal government.
But given that expansion of patronage served the interests of
Democrats in both chambers, it is no surprise that a compromise
was hammered out. The bankruptcy judges would acquire signifi
cant new powers and independence, but they would become Article
I judges rather than Article ID judges. They would become presi
dential appointments, but their terms were limited to fourteen
years, and appeal from their orders would be to district courts.
Constitutional concerns139 were met with assurances from the Chief
Justice that the Supreme Court would uphold the new bankruptcy
positions.140 The bankruptcy agency would be put on a hold, but a
pilot program would be initiated. The Democratic Party as a whole
would benefit from the elevation of the status of bankruptcy judges,
and because the party controlled the Senate, the Senate Democrats
could be expected to consent as long as suitably compensated for
any political disadvantage.
But one problem remained. The compromise may have satis
fied the Senate Democrats' fear that they would lose patronage
power vis-a-vis the House Democrats. It did not, however, address
the federal judges' own desire not to lose any status at all. Hence,
the dramatic intervention of Chief Justice Burger. Burger, who had
earlier opposed the elevation of bankruptcy judges in a letter to
Senator DeConcini141 and through the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, telephoned DeConcini and other senators, af
ter the House passed the compromise bill, and complained about
presidential appointment of bankruptcy judges, their retirement
benefits, and their status as adjuncts to the circuit courts.142 "Bur
ger 'not only lobbied, but pressured and attempted to be intimidat
ing,' DeConcini said. He said the Chief Justice was 'very, very irate
and rude.' "143 Nevertheless, the second Senate amendment threw
some crumbs to Burger in the form of remarkably petty reductions
139. See 1977 House Supp. Hearings, supra note 58; 1977 HousE SuPP. REPORT, supra

note 57.

140. Or so it was believed by many representatives, who would later blame Burger for
violating a deal when the Supreme Court struck down the bankruptcy positions in 1982. See
Klee Interview, supra note 82. It is possible that the representatives read what they desired
into ambiguous statements. See Feidler Interview, supra note 80.
141. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 878-79 (letter from Chief Justice Warren
Burger to Senator DeConcini (Nov. 7, 1977)).
142. See Linda Greenhouse, Lobbying By Burger Provokes Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1978, at 39; Congress Approves New Bankruptcy System, supra note 41, at 180.
143. Congress Approves New Bankruptcy System, supra note 41, at 180.
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in the independence and status of the bankruptcy judges.144 First,
the Senate made it more difficult for bankruptcy judges to acquire
clerks, adding a requirement that acquisition be "based on need"
rather than based on right.145 Second, the Senate added to the ap
pointment provision the requirement that the "President shall give
due consideration to the recommended nominees of the Judicial
Council of the Circuit within which an appointment is to be
made." 146 Third, the Senate eliminated the retirement plan of fu
ture bankruptcy judges and reduced the retirement benefits en
joyed by incumbents. Fourth, the Senate gave the chief judge of
each circuit the power to evaluate the qualifications of incumbent
bankruptcy judges who were to continue in the office during the
transition. Finally, there is even an ambiguous provision that led
Congressman Edwards to raise, but then dismiss, the possibility that
the Senate sought to prevent incumbent bankruptcy judges from
referring to themselves as "judges," rather than referees.147
Why did DeConcini make these concessions to Burger? There
are two possible explanations. First, the vehemence of the federal
judges' protest may have led DeConcini to reconsider his judgment
that under the compromise bill the Senate would not lose too much
patronage power. If federal judges were upset about the bill, that
must mean that they expected to lose a great deal of status. If that
was so and the position of federal judge would therefore become
less attractive, the Senate had lost more patronage power than it
had first thought. Second, DeConcini may have worried that the
Supreme Court would undo the legislative deal, either by interpret
ing the statute in a strict way or even by striking down the already
constitutionally suspect provisions dealing with bankruptcy judges.
The House, in going along with the Senate's unilateral amendment,
may have shared this concern. As mentioned earlier, the legislative
managers understood the constitutional complications raised by the
144. That these concessions were directly in response to Burger's concerns and not moti
vated by something else is likely, as there is no evidence of any other intervening events.
Senator Thurmond "said that the final version approved by the Senate incorporated a
number of changes urged by Burger." Mike Shahan, N.Y. TlMEs NEWSWIRE, Oct. 7, 1978, at
32; see also Robert Feidler & Harry Dixon, Reflections on the Legislative History ofthe Bank
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in ANNuAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 43, 51 (William L
Norton, Jr. ed., 1979). Burger, not satisfied with these concessions, unsuccessfully lobbied
President Carter to veto the bill. See Malcolm Wallop, Footnotes to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 53, 59 (William L Norton, Jr. ed.,
1979).
145. See 124 CoNo. REc. 34,144 (1978) (speech of Hon. Don Edwards) (internal quota
tion marks omitted).
146. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. See id.
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proposed Article I status of the bankruptcy judges and doubtless
feared that an offended Supreme Court could seize upon these
complications and undo ten years of legislative work.
Before ending this story, we need to tie two loose ends. First,
one might wonder why the Republicans went along with the Demo
crats' efforts to create patronage positions that only the Democrats
would fill. The answer to this question is probably that resistance
was futile given the Democrats' large majorities in each house; that
little political gain could be achieved from resistance, because the
subject was complex and the public uninterested; and that the
Republicans may not have objected to the increase in federal pa
tronage opportunities that would benefit them if and when they re
turned to political power. Note that when the House Democrats
split over the question of elevating the status of bankruptcy judges
and creating a bankruptcy agency, the Republicans sided with the
dissenters - an indication that they opposed the increase in pa
tronage that would benefit Democrats.148
Second, we noted earlier that the more sophisticated public
choice models give some role to the electorate. Politicians do not
make transfers to special interests when voters observe these trans
fers, disapprove of them, and respond to them by voting against the
politicians when they run for reelection. One hypothesis is that pol
iticians will choose an inefficient form of a transfer in order to con
ceal it from the voters.149 This hypothesis sheds light on some
features of the legislative history of the Code. It seems likely that
Congress modified the role of the bankruptcy judge in such a way
that increased status, rather than simply increasing salary, because
voters would more likely observe and object to the increase in sal
ary. Thus did the 1977 House Report quote approvingly from a
Justice Department report: "We will never pay the incomes to
judges that they could earn in other pursuits and we must not create
conditions that require us to settle for second best in the federal
courts. "150 The reason that judges cannot be paid their market
value may be that voters do not want to spend that much on judges,
or (more likely) judges' salaries are linked to Congressional salaries
and voters do not want to spend too much on members of Con148. See Congress Approves New Bankruptcy System, supra note 41, at 179, 8-H.
149. See, e.g., Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, On the Form of Transfers to Special
Interests, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1210 (1995).
150. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 22 (1977) (quoting COMMITI'EE ON REVISION OF nm FED.
JUDICIAL SYS , U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE NEEDS OF nm FEDERAL COURTS 7 (1977)),
.

October 1997]

Bankruptcy Reform Act

93

gress.151 In either case, payment in status is a disguised transfer,
designed to circumvent the political restrictions on payment in
money. In addition, we saw that the House decided to put the
bankruptcy agency within the Justice Department rather than creat
ing a new federal agency along the lines proposed by the Commis
sion. In doing so, the House lost the opportunity to create a
valuable presidential appointment; but it also reduced the likeli
hood of accusations of patronage. Voters and their watchdogs are
more likely to object to the addition of a new agency to the federal
bureaucracy than to some tinkering with the internal structure of an
existing agency.152
Although our story ends in 1978, the reader may be interested in
subsequent events. In 1982 the Supreme Court struck down the
provisions in the 1978 Act relating to the position of bankruptcy
judges.153 The Court held that the Act violated the Constitution by
giving Article III powers to judges who do not have lifetime tenure
and independent salaries. Justice Burger joined the dissent, which
argued that the bankruptcy courts could be considered limited Arti
cle I courts. House members felt that Burger had broken a promise
to deliver Supreme Court approval of the 1978 Act.154 Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, joined by Powell, formed the plurality.
The outcome is probably attributable to their commitment to the
independence of the federal judiciary, and not to the fact that much
of the patronage power in the federal government had shifted to
the Republicans in 1981. Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred on
narrower grounds. Congress responded in 1984 by placing the
bankruptcy judges more solidly under the authority of- the district
151. In 1975 Congress linked salaries of members of Congress to those of other federal
workers in an effort to disguise salary increases benefiting themselves. See R. DouoLAS
ARNOLD, THE Lome OF CoNGRESSIONAL AcnoN 104 (1990).
152. There is a third question. How could it be the case both that bankruptcy judges
expected to gain from the 1978 Act through reappointment and enhanced status, and that
Congress expected to gain through increased patronage powers? If the judges kept their
jobs, Congress would have been unable to have other people appointed. The answer is prob
ably that the bankruptcy judges predicted (accurately) that they would be able to keep their
jobs for a while, given the dislocation of transition, and that Congress saw the change as a
relatively long-term change. In 1977 and 1978 future Republican power could not have been
foreseen.
153. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 {1982).
154. See Klee Interview, supra note 82. This may explain why Burger insisted in a sepa

rate opinion that the plurality did not hold that the bankruptcy courts violated Article III and
that the holding should be interpreted more narrowly. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92
(Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("I write separately to emphasize that, notwithstanding the plural
ity opinion, the Court does not hold today that Congress' broad grant of jurisdiction to the
new bankruptcy courts is generally inconsistent with Art[icle] III of the Constitution.").
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courts.155 The way in which constitutional constraints interfered
with attempts by the relevant political agents to strike a deal, one
that gave bankruptcy judges more power but not too much more
power, is worth some thought. They forced the participants either
to keep the bankruptcy judges completely subordinate to the dis
trict courts or to make them Article III judges, as the House sought,
and denied them an important route of compromise.
In 1986, the U.S. Trustee program was made permanent and ex
panded to cover every state, except Alabama and North Caro
lina.156 But in the meantime the patronage hypothesis - at least in
outcome if not necessarily in intent - was confirmed. According
to the first director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, in the
early 1980s "[t]he Department of Justice expressly said the [U.S.
Trustee] program would get more support if politicians were invited
to make U.S. Trustee appointments. They actually solicited various
senators for their views as to who the U.S. Trustee should be."157 In
doing so, the Justice Department merely followed the plan of the
drafters.15s Similar, albeit not quite as credible, claims were made
about the trustees appointed by the U.S. Trustees. One bankruptcy
judge said:
When the pilot project started, I thought, "Maybe this is a good
idea. Perhaps it will take some of the politics and favoritism out of
the system," . . . . I quickly realized that it didn't. It just switched
whose ox was being gored by whom. It was the U.S. 'frustees' friends
who were now being appointed as panel trustees.159

Aside from patronage concerns, there is a general view that the
U.S. Trustee system has not worked well; this view will be discussed
in the conclusion.
VI.

EXEMPTIONS

Federal and state interests divided even more sharply over ex
emption policy than they did over administrative structure. States
155. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, §§ lOl(a), 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 333, 336-41 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-58,
1334 (1994)).
156. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 &
28 u.s.c. (1994)).
157. How the U.S. Trustee Program Got Politicized, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) A7, A7
(Oct. 22, 1996) (quoting Richard Levine, former Director, Executive Office for U.S.
Trustees).
158. See supra text accompanying note 136.
159. Why ls the U.S. Trustee Program Such a Lightening Rod, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
Al, AB (Oct. 22, 1996) (quoting anonymous bankruptcy judge).
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had controlled exemption policy since the United States had come
into existence. On the eve of the 1978 Act, federal bankruptcy law
incorporated state exemptions, and although federal law supple
mented state exemptions with a handful of federal exemptions (for
foreign service workers, :fishermen, seamen, longshoremen, railroad
workers, and veterans160), the federal exemptions did not play a sig
nificant role in bankruptcy cases. The legislative history of the 1978
Act displays an effort by federal authorities once again to wrest
control of exemption policy from the states.
To understand the conflict over exemption policy, one must dis
tinguish the issue of federalism and the issue of the proper content
of exemption law. The issue of federalism concerns whether the
federal government or the states will have control over exemption
policy. The issue of content concerns the proper level of generosity
of exemption law, including both the monetary value of protected
property and the kind of protected property. If politicians can gain
political rewards by changing exemption law (in whichever direc
tion), then one should expect a conflict between federal and local
authorities over the power to control exemption law. If some inter
est groups have more power at the federal level while others have
more power at the state level, then one should expect the former to
prefer federal control of exemption policy and the latter to prefer
state control of exemption policy. But whether control of exemp
tion policy lies in the hands of state politicians or in the hands of
federal politicians, interest groups will lobby the appropriate gov
ernment for the exemption rules they prefer.
These observations raise the question whether the politicians in
volved in bankruptcy reform during the 1960s and 1970s actually
believed that having control over exemption law was valuable. At
first sight, one might think not. As noted earlier, many of the
states' exemptions were archaic, providing protection for partici
pants in an economy that no longer existed. Many states had not
amended their exemption laws in dozens of years. If control of ex
emption law provided a fruitful means of making political payoffs,
one might expect the kind of constant tinkering with it that one sees
in tax law. The dominant view of commentators writing before the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code was that state legislatures did
not care about exemption law.161

160. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 75 (1978).
161. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 30.
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This view, however, was wrong. Control over exemption policy
had proved its value to state politicians in many ways. First, control
over exemption law had allowed state authorities to respond to the
demands of newly powerful classes of overburdened debtors during
times of economic depression. Again and again during the nine
teenth and twentieth centuries, states increased the generosity of
exemption laws when an economic downturn caused default by
debtors in large numbers.162 This legislation interfered with efforts
by creditors to seize property to satisfy unpaid debts. The enact
ment of such laws must have been a straightforward and effective
way for politicians to earn the gratitude of a large number of highly
interested voters, the overburdened debtors, without alienating
continuing debtors, who were probably sympathetic to the plight of
overburdened debtors, and without risking much retaliation from
the creditors, whose political power ebbed during economic down
turns. Second, a glance at the current state exemption laws reveals
the fingerprints of traditional interest groups. The exemption laws
of virtually every state single out for favorable treatment groups of
well-known political influence, such as insurance companies, farm
ers, teachers, veterans, and charitable organizations.163 Third, at
least one state (Texas) and possibly others that sought to expand
their population in the nineteenth century used exemption laws to
encourage immigration from other states. By prohibiting creditors
from collecting from the assets of residents, a state's generous ex
emption law encourages overburdened debtors to immigrate - a
practice that continues to this day.164 Although it is true that many
of the exemption laws on the books go back more than a hundred
years, most states did modify their exemption laws from time to
time, and they continue to do so even today.16s
162. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974); CHARLES
WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935); Paul Goodman, The Emergence

ofthe Homestead Exemption in the United States: Accommodation and Resistance to the Mar
ket Revolution, 1840-1880, SO J. AM. HIST. 470 (1993).
163. Massachusetts, for example, singles out benefits from various insurance policies, see,
e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 175, § llOA (Supp. 1997) (accident and sickness insurance), farm
ing products, see MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 34 (1975), pensions of public employees, see
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 32, § 19 (1993), veterans' benefits, see MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 115, § 5
(1981), and fraternal benefit society benefits, see MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 176, § 22 (1958).
164. Cf. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1369 (statement of Alvin 0. Wiese,

Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Bankruptcy, National Consumer Fmance Association).
165. For example, Connecticut created a new $75,000 homestead exemption in 1992, see
1993 Conn. Acts 93-301, § 2 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-352b(t) & note 10 (West Supp. 1997)); California raised its homestead exemptions in
1990, 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 155, § 1 {codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 704.730 &
note (West Supp. 1997)), and created a $5000 exemption for jewelry, heirlooms, and art in
1995, 1995 Cal. Stat ch. 196, § 2 (codified as amended at CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 704.040
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If control over exemption policy was valuable to state politi
cians, then it must have appeared valuable to federal politicians as
well. Control over exemption policy would have given federal ,au
thorities the power to provide relief to debtors in times of economic
distress. More immediately, Congress would have the power to cre
ate exemptions that benefited insurance companies, banks, farmers,
and other groups that could provide the greatest political support.
To the extent that local control of exemption law created spillovers,
control over exemption policy would allow the federal government
to eliminate those spillovers and gain the support of those whom
they injured. These considerations no doubt motivated the unsuc
cessful efforts of Congress to seize control of exemption policy in
the nineteenth century and its successful efforts to create exemp
tions for particular categories of workers. And the same motiva
tions would cause some members of Congress to use the
widespread belief in the need for bankruptcy reform in the 1960s
and 1970s as an excuse for the federal government to seize control
of exemption policy from the states yet again.

The normative case for federal control of exemption policy,
however, was weak. The academic critics in the 1950s and 1960s
argued that Congress should enact a system of uniform federal ex
emptions on the grounds that the state exemptions were too often
archaic, too variable, and too generous or too mean;166 but they
never explained why control of exemption policy should lie with the
federal government rather than with the states.167 The variability of
exemption law suggested, if anything, that tastes about credit risk
and protection against default differed greatly from locality to local
ity and that therefore uniformity imposed at the national level
would have served no purpose.
The strongest case for uniform federal exemptions arises from
the problem of spillovers. When states enact inconsistent laws,
there sometimes results a "race to the bottom," in which all states
become worse off as a result of their competition for resources. A
common example is that of pollution: in the absence of federal pol
lution laws, states would enact suboptimal pollution laws because
the cost of pollution is partly born by downwind or downstream
(West Supp. 1997)); Arizona raised its homestead exemption in 1989, see 1989 Ariz. Sess.
Laws ch. 90, § 1 (codified as amended at .ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101 (West 1990)); and
Washington modified its motor vehicle exemption in 1991, 1991 Wash. Laws ch. 11, § 5 (codi
fied as amended at WASH. REv. CooB § 6.15.010 (1996)).
166. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 30; Comment, supra note 30.
167. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 445-46, 451-53 (making this criticism).
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states, while the benefits of weak pollution laws, in the form of jobs
and industry, accrue to the state that enacts the law. But if all states
follow this logic, the aggregate costs will exceed the aggregate bene
fits. Uniform federal environmental laws would solve this pris
oner's dilemma.
One analogy with respect to exemption laws concerns their ef
fect on migration. As noted above, Texas originally created gener
ous exemption laws to encourage migration from other states.
Texas may correctly have calculated that the benefits of an in
creased population would exceed the higher cost of credit incurred
by its citizens; but if all states had enacted generous exemption laws
for this purpose, the migration gains would have disappeared while
the cost of credit would have remained high everywhere. By
preventing states from competing for migrants through exemptions,
a uniform federal exemption law would prevent the race to the bot
tom. The problem with this argument, however, is that whatever
the truth about Texas' motives in the nineteenth century, it is
doubtful that modern states use exemption law to encourage migra
tion, because people probably do not take exemption laws into ac
count when deciding whether to migrate. 16s
Another possible source of spillovers might be efforts by states
to externalize the cost of default. If one state's exemption regime is
more generous than those of other states, perhaps national credi
tors would spread the increased cost of collection in the high
exemption state among debtors in all the other states. All debtors
would pay the same higher interest rate, but debtors in the high
exemption state would, in effect, pay less in interest charges for
their right to keep more assets in case of default. But if the other
states responded by increasing their exemptions, this benefit would
be lost, while debtors in all states would pay the high interest rates
- in effect, paying for more protection in case of default than they
want. The problem with this argument, however, is that national
creditors (to say nothing of local creditors) can adjust interest rates
by state, charging the debtors in high-exemption states higher inter
est rates than they charge debtors in low-exemption states.169
168. Cf. Schill, supra note 11, at 1295 & n.173. One study finds a statistically significant
correlation between the level of Chapter 7 filings in a state and the amount of immigration
into that state, see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 201 (1996), but because most studies find no relation between the level of
Chapter 7 filings in a state and the generosity of its exemption laws, see infra note 254, the
results of the study provide no reason for believing that generous exemption laws attract
migrants.
169. Schill considers and rejects a similar spillover argument for state real estate exemp
tion laws and related laws. See Schill, supra note 11, at 1288-96.

October 1997]

Bankruptcy Reform Act

99

A third possible source of spillovers might be efforts by states to
externalize the cost of poverty. Citizens in each state might believe
that exemption laws should cushion people against bad luck or im
providence but fear that generous exemption laws would attract
poor people from other states. Uniform exemptions would resolve
this fear. The problem, again, is that no evidence suggests that gen
erous exemption laws attract migrants in large numbers.
If spillovers caused significant losses, one would expect efforts
by the states to produce a uniform law, because the reciprocity of
the supposed harm means that uniformity would have produced
mutual gains.170 Yet the uniform exemptions law recommended in
1976 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws was enacted by just one state!171
Despite the shaky normative foundations for nationalizing ex
emption law, that idea made it onto the agenda of bankruptcy re
form in the 1970s. The Commission endorsed the idea of uniform
federal exemptions without justifying its position. It simply re
ferred to the great diversity of state exemption laws.172 The partic
ular exemptions contained in the CB - for example, $5,000
homestead plus $500 per dependent and $1,000 for general personal
property - were also not explained. In addition, the CB provided
that the exemptions would be nonwaivable and gave the debtor the
right to avoid judicial liens in exempt property and nonpurchase
money security interests in household goods. The JB provided for a
set of minimum federal exemptions - including $6,000 plus $600
per dependent for the homestead and $3,000 for general personal
property - and allowed the states to choose higher exemptions so
long as they did not in the aggregate exceed $25,000.113
It may seem facile to argue that the Commission favored uni
form federal exemptions because they would transfer power over
exemption policy from the states to the federal government. But
recall that four of the nine members were members of Congress including Burdick and Edwards, the legislative managers for the
Senate and House - and three were presidential appointees.174
170. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform
States Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 137-41 {1996).
171. See id. at 188-89 app. tbl.Al.
172. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 10, 170-73 {1973).
173. See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 146-47 app.
174. The only federal agency to testify on this topic, tbe Federal Trade Commission's
Bureau of Consumer Protection, supported unifq_rm minimum federal exemptions. See 197576 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 758-Q3 (statement of David H. Williams, Attorney,

Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission).

100

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:47

The two federal judges on the Commission also probably had no
objections - political or philosophical - to federal exemption
law.11s The entire membership of the Commission comprised peo
ple whose position, influence, and interest were connected with the
federal government; seven of the nine members either would di
rectly benefit from a transfer of the power over exemption law from
the states to the federal government or were appointed to the Com
mission by someone who would benefit from such a transfer. As
agents of the federal government, they sought an expansion of its
power. Against this, one might object that the Commission mem
bers simply did not realize that state authority over exemptions
could be justified on normative grounds. They failed to provide a
rationale for federal exemptions because the rationale was, in their
minds, obvious. But this theory overlooks the fact that the reporter
for the Commission, Frank Kennedy, had written an article defend
ing the old law's incorporation of state exemptions just 13 years
before the release of the Commission's report.116
Although bankruptcy judges were officials of the federal gov
ernment, their power was local. Unlike the Commission members,
they did not have an interest in transferring power over exemption
law from the states to the federal government. Indeed, if they had
any interest at all in the subject of exemption law, it was either to
simplify it, in order to make their jobs easier, or not to change it, in
order to avoid having to learn new law. The JB's endorsement of
minimum federal exemptions may have been a compromise be
tween these impulses. It may also have been designed to appeal to
Congress, in order to give the bill legitimacy and plausibility. The
$25,000 ceiling is hard to explain; perhaps the bankruptcy judges
thought that bankruptcy law would seem illegitimate if wealthy
people could obtain protection from it. At any rate, this idea would
have no influence on subsequent events. Because the bankruptcy
judges did not share the Commission members' interest in federal
izing exemption policy, they preferred to leave some of exemption
policy under local control.
Rather than choosing between the CB and the JB, House Bill

8200 established a set of federal exemptions but gave the debtor the
right to choose between the federal exemptions and the state ex
emptions. This approach effectively meant that the federal exemp175. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts supported uniform federal exemp
tions. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 20 (statement of H. Kent Presson,
Assistant Chief, Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
176. See Kennedy, supra note 30.
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tions provided a floor. These exemptions included $10,000 for the
homestead and $5,000 for miscellaneous personal property. In ad
dition, House Bill 8200 followed the CB in malting the exemptions
nonwaivable and giving the debtor the right to void a judicial lien in
exempt property and a nonpurchase money security interest in
household goods and related property. Senate Bill 2266 followed
the 1898 Act and left exemption policy to the states. Although it
added a right to redeem, it did not create rights to void any liens.
Why did the House retreat from uniformity and propose instead
a federal floor? There is little evidence bearing on this question,
but it is possible to make some conjectures. One conjecture is that
state officials made their influence felt behind the scenes. Although
state officials' first choice would have been to retain complete con
trol over exemption policy, their influence may have been strong
enough only to effect a compromise in which they retained control
over the ceiling, the Congress over the floor.
Another conjecture emerges from the conflicting behavior of
creditors. One might believe that creditors would, as a group, pre
fer a federal ceiling to a federal floor and that House Bill 8200 rep
resented a defeat. In fact, the story is more complicated. The
American Bankers Association supported minimum federal exemp
tions,177 while the National Consumer Finance Association and the
National Credit Union Association favored uniform federal exemp
tions.178 Insurance companies179 and the National Association of
Credit Management180 favored state control over exemption policy.
To explain this distribution of positions, observe that creditor
groups whose members were locally powerful - banks, insurance
companies, and local businesses - preferred either complete state
control or some state control.181 Creditor groups whose members
177. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 128, 136 (statement and testimony of
Walter W. Vaughan, Vice President, American Security Bank, and Chairman, American
Bankers Association and Consumers Bankers Association Task Forces on Bankruptcy).
178. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1368-69 (statement of Alvin 0.
Wiese, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Bankruptcy, National Consumer Finance
Association).
179. See id. at 1584-85 (statement of John J. Creedon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Fed
eral Bankruptcy Legislation, American Life Insurance Association); id. at 1645-49 (letter
from National Association of Insurance Commissioners to Representative Don Edwards,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights}.
180. See id. at 1674 (statement of Richard Kaufman, National Association of Credit Man
agement). The National Association of Credit Management consists of manufacturers, dis
tributors, financial institutions, and firms in service industries.
181. According to Klee, it was generally understood that banks had significant influence
at the state level and used their influence on governors, who made their influence felt at the
federal level through the National Association of Attorneys General. See Klee Interview,

·
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were not locally powerful - credit unions, finance companies182 preferred more federal control. Because their power was greater at
the federal than at the local level, the credit unions and finance
companies believed that their influence could ensure that only fed
eral, not local, exemptions would be sufficiently low. Whatever the
content of exemption law, creditors likely preferred authority over
exemption policy at that level of government over which they had
the most infl.uence.183
Creditors may also have tried to use the opportunity of exemp
tion reform to gain competitive advantages in the credit market.
Banks issued lower risk credit, either secured or unsecured, and ap
parently, because of fear of bad publicity, usually avoided pursuing
debtors too aggressively - for example, by taking household goods

as collateral or seizing them from defaulting debtors.184 Consumer
finance companies issued higher risk credit, both secured and un
secured, and did take household goods as collateral.185 If typical
bank credit - especially, mortgage loans and loans secured by per

sonal property - and finance company credit were close enough
substitutes that an increase in the price of one would increase the
demand for the other, then banks may have supported minimum

federal exemptions in the hope that the higher effective exemption
level that would result in states that had stingier exemptions would
reduce the amount of collateral available to consumer finance com
panies without affecting the amount of collateral available to
banks.1s6
This conjecture is supported by evidence of two related conflicts
between banks and consumer finance companies. The first conflict
supra note 82. The political power of banks in many states is confirmed by research. See,
e.g., SARAH McCALLY MoREHousE, STATE POI.mes, PARTIES AND PouCY 108-12 (1981}.
182. A list of interest groups that have power at the state level contains banks, business,
and insurance companies, but not credit unions and finance companies. See MOREHOUSE,
supra note 181, at 108-12 tbl.3-2.
183. Cf. THOMAS R. DYE, PoUTics IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES SS (3rd ed. 1977}
(finding that oil companies preferred state regulation over offshore oil wells to federal regu
lation, because they feared having less influence over federal regulators than they already
had over state regulators).
184. See Letsou, supra note 14, at 632-33.
18S. See id. According to the FTC, although banks sometimes rely on nonpurchase
money security interests in household goods, "[f]inance companies are the preeminent
users." Trade Regulation Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 7739, 7762 (Federal Trade Commn. 1984)
(credit practices) (commentary on 16 C.F.R. § 444).
186. A study of credit data from 1978 to 1983 found competition between bank automo
bile loans and finance company personal loans, bank personal loans and finance company
personal loans, and bank mortgages and finance company personal loans. See Gregory E.
Elliehausen & John D. Wolken, Market Definition and Product Segmentation for Household
Credit, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES REs. 21 {1990).

·
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occurred over the right of redemption. Creditors generally dislike
the right of redemption because it gives debtors the capacity to im
pose delay and litigation costs on the creditors, and debtors use the
threat of delay to obtain some loan forgiveness. A limited right to
redemption, however, would have a differential impact on creditors.
Consider the right to redeem limited to goods, not real property,
and excluding goods subject to purchase money security interests.
This limited right to redeem injures the consumer finance compa
nies, which depend heavily on nonpurchase money security inter
ests in household goods; but it does not injure banks, because they
depend mostly on real estate mortgages and purchase money secur
ity interests. The limited right to redeem thus might force the con
sumer finance companies to raise interest rates, driving their
customers into the arms of the banks, whose interest rates would be
unaffected. This may explain why in the legislative history banks
supported a right to redemption of collateral except that used for
purchase money security interests,187 while the consumer finance
companies'
prevailed.

opposed the right of redemption.188

The banks

The second conflict occurred outside of the context of bank
ruptcy. When the FfC proposed rules restricting wage assignments
and security interests in household goods, the consumer finance in
dustry responded by challenging them through political and legal
channels, whereas the banks remained mostly passive. An empiri
cal study shows that legal restrictions on wage assignments reduced
the amount of credit issued by consumer finance companies while
not affecting the amount of credit issued by banks (and improving
the position of credit unions).189 Although this study does not show
that legal restrictions on security interests in household goods pro
duced similar results, the logic is similar and so banks may have
thought this result likely. The banks' passivity suggests that they
saw in the proposed rules a competitive advantage.190
Finally, insurance companies had done well at the state level.
The exemption of insurance proceeds in many states encouraged
187. See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1025, 1039-40 (statement and testi
mony of Walter W. Vaughan, Vice President, American Security Bank, and Chairman, Amer
ican Bankers Association and Consumers Bankers Association Task Forces on Bankruptcy).
188. See id. at 1045-46 (statement of Walter Ray Phillips, Household Finance Corpora
tion); 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 651 (statement of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Chair
man, Subcommittee on Bankruptcy, National Consumer Finance Association).
189. See Daniel J. Villegas, Regulation of Creditor Practices: An Evaluation ofthe FTC's
Credit Practice Rule, 42 J. EcoN. & Bus. 51, 64, 65 tbl.3 (1990).
190. See Letson, supra note 14, at 634-35.
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debtors who anticipated bankruptcy to sell off nonexempt property
and purchase insurance. The insurance industry likely supported
state control of exemption policy, because it did not want to risk
losing its favorable position.
The national lawyer groups, such as the National Consumer
Law Center191 and the Commercial Law League, supported federal
control of exemption law, and their influence on Congress was
greater than that of the local bar associations, which generally sup
ported state control. Presumably, each group preferred seeing ex
emption policy in control of the level of government over which it
had the most influence, but since it was Congress that was making
the decision, the national groups did better than the local groups.
We can summarize the argument so far in the following way.
Consider the biggest winners and losers from the federal exemption
floor. In the stingy states the continuing debtors and creditors as a
group would lose, but the lawyers, the overburdened debtors, and
possibly certain powerful classes of creditors, such as the banks,
would win. The losers had less political power at the national level
than the winners did, especially because, as we saw, the creditors
were divided by their interests. In the generous states a federal ex
emption floor would have had no effect.
Now consider the winners and losers from uniform federal ex
emptions. The story is the same for the stingy states, but in the
generous states, now the lawyers, possibly the overburdened debt
ors, and certain creditors would lose, while the continuing debtors
and creditors as a group would gain. In other words, the politically
weak would prevail.
Minim.um federal exemptions benefited some politically power
ful groups without offending any other politically powerful groups,
so they were preferred to uniform federal exemptions, which of
fended the politically powerful groups in the more generous states.
This argument raises the question why the Senate sought to
leave exemption policy to the states. If the House would have
gained from enacting a minimum exemption law because it would
transfer payoffs from the state governments to the federal govern
ment, why wouldn't the Senate have gained as well? To answer this
question, we must consider in more detail the relationship between
local and national authorities.
191. The NCLC supported minimum federal exemptions. See 1975-76 House Hearings,
supra note 54, at 937-38 (statement of Ernest L. Sarason, Jr., Staff Attorney, National Con

sumer Law Center).
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We have been assuming so far that the federal government
would seize political power from state governments whenever it
could, but this assumption conflicts with observed behavior. In fact,
there are two reasons why the federal government might leave cer
tain areas of the law to the states, even though it has the constitu
tional power to legislate in these areas itself.192 First, when local

interests have invested resources in understanding existing state
legislation, they stand to lose their valuable legislation-specific ex
pertise if Congress enacts superseding law. Recall that bankruptcy
lawyers resisted the Chandler Act apparently because of the fear
that it would eliminate the relevance of their expertise.193 To avoid
this kind of loss, lawyers will pay off the federal government, either
by giving support directly to federal politicians or by using their
local influence to cause state politicians to pay off federal
politicians.

It is true that bankruptcy lawyers and judges had valuable ex
pertise regarding the nuances of state exemption law - the com
plexity of which cannot be exaggerated - and would have been
reluctant to lose it. Indeed, the bankruptcy judges and many law
yers - and particularly local organizations, like state bar associa
tions - opposed uniform federal exemptions and supported either
state control or no more than a federal floor.194 Still, this story is
not very satisfying. Exemption law composed a small portion of the
bankruptcy lawyers' and judges' expertise, and with respect to other
areas of bankruptcy law, far from opposing reform out of a desire
to maintain the relevance of their expertise, they enthusiastically
supported it.
The second reason why the federal government leaves legisla
tive power with state governments is that state governments have

192. This is loosely based on Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators
and the Economic Theory ofRegulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism,
76 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990). See also Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political
Economy ofFederalism, in PERsPECTIVES ON PuBuc CH01CE: A HANDBOOK 73 (Dennis C.

Mueller ed., 1997).
193. See supra note 34.
194. Local lawyers favored state control over exemptions, or federal minimum exemp
tions. The latter policy may have seemed attractive because it would allow them to use local
influence to ratchet up exemptions without risking a reduction in the level of exemptions.
Debtors' lawyers probably preferred high exemptions, because it increases the demand for
their services; it is hard to say what creditors' lawyers would want See, e.g., 1975-76 House
Hearings, supra note 54, at 1256 (statement of Robert Ward, California bankruptcy attorney)
(supporting state exemptions); id. at 1339 (statement of Paul L. Winkler, California bank
ruptcy attorney) (supporting federal minimum exemptions); id. at 1558 (testimony of Louis
W. Levit, Commercial Law League) (discussing support for federal uniform exemptions); id.
at 1658 (statement of L.E. Creel, III, Dallas Bar Association) (supporting minimum federal
exemptions).
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greater information about local interests than the federal govern
ment does and can therefore satisfy them more successfully; either
the state governments or these local interests can take enough of
the surplus from more efficient state regulation to be able to "pay"
the federal government more than the latter would obtain through
direct regulation. It is plausible that state politicians had quicker
and more accurate access to information about the optimal level of
exemption for the interests that benefited from it than did federal
politicians. As a result, state officials had a greater ability to tailor
exemption policy to the idiosyncracies of their state.195 In one
state, for example, insurance companies are powerful and would
pay a lot for exemptions for insurance proceeds; in another state,
the farmers have all the power. If state officials could earn more
political support from controlling exemption policy than federal of
ficials could, then the parties had an incentive to make a deal in
which the federal officials leave exemption control in state hands in
return for some kind of "payment." The form of "payment" could,
of course, vary. State officials might promise to supply patronage
to federal officials or to support them in elections. In addition, in
terest groups with both local and national power could deter a fed
eral takeover of exemption policy from the states by threatening to

withhold support.

These stories suggest two reasons why the Senate and the House
came into conflict over the level of government control of exemp
tions. First, senators owed more of their political power to state
political organizations than representatives did. Exemption policy
does not interest people at the district level; it does at the state
level, since the state, not the district, is the source of state law. Sec
ond, the Senate was disproportionately influenced by the less popu
lous, more rural states.196 The powerful farming lobbies in those
states care deeply about a transfer of control over exemption policy
from the states, where their influence is strong, to the federal gov
ernment, where their influence is diluted. Since their influence at
the federal level is stronger in the Senate than in the House, how
ever, they can use their national influence to block the transfer.
Another reason for the difference may have been personal or
ideological. Senator Wallop was a believer in state's rights and had
recently been involved, as a state politician, in the amendment of
195. See id. at 864-65 (testimony of Philip Shuchman, Law Professor, University of Con·
necticut); id. at 762 (David H. \Vtlliams, Federal Trade Commission).
196. Cf. DYE, supra note 183, at 62 (observing that urban interests prefer national power
to state power).
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Wyoming's exemption laws. As chairman of the Judiciary Commit
tee, he had disproportionate control over the legislation, and appar
ently he cared only about this issue. Many senators had similar
views about states' rights, whereas the House was dominated by
believers in New Deal liberalism and centralized government.197 It
remains an open question, however, whether members cared
enough about these ideological commitments to resist pressures
from interest groups.
The compromise bill in Stage 3 provided still another variation
on exemption law: a set of uniform federal exemptions, including
the power to avoid certain liens, with a state right to opt out. The
compromise meant that a state could, by legislative direction, force
debtors to use exemptions that are lower than the federal exemp
tions; or it could force debtors to use exemptions that are higher
than the federal exemptions; or it could leave the debtor the choice
of using federal or state exemptions. The opt-out idea ingeniously
gave the federal government control over exemption policy in all
the states for which the interest in exemption policy was low, but
not from the states that had a powerful interest in control of exemp
tion policy. As a result, the federal government picked up some
power without offending those with the most to lose. Most states
did, in fact, opt out, showing again that the states did care about
controlling exemption policy. Nevertheless, Congress gained some
control over exemption policy.
There is one last question. Why was it never proposed that
Congress create nonuniform exemptions - that is, exemptions that
vary from state to state? After all, Congress had often enacted leg
islation that affected states differentially - for example, laws relat
ing to building projects. Such a proposal would have allowed
Congress to give each state the exemption law that maximized
value to local interests and to gain in return the maximum amount
of political support. The answer may be that Congress could obtain
creditor support for federal exemption law only by promising to
make exemption law uniform or at least more uniform than it had
been. Creditors disliked the ability of debtors to change residences
under the old law in order to escape collection.198 Another possible
answer is that because one of the most powerful justifications for
197. This is Feidler's theory. See Feidler Interview, supra note 80.
198. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1369 (statement of Alvin 0.
Wiese, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Bankruptcy, National Consumer Finance Associa
tion); id. at 1394 (statement of Jonathan J. Lindley, Director of Washington D.C. Office,
Credit Union National Association).
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bankruptcy reform was the complexity of the old bankruptcy law,
federal differential exemptions would have appeared to be a step
backwards. A final answer, consistent with the theory presented
above, is that determining the optimal exemption on a state-by
state basis would have been too complicated for Congress, and it
did better by, in effect, franchising exemption policy to the states.
VII.

BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS

The legislative history of the Code contains a number of inter
esting conflicts over the law of corporate reorganization. It might
surprise some people to learn that an argument that did not have
much prominence is an argument currently used by many scholars
to justify Chapter 11, namely that reorganization protects employ
ees from the dislocation caused by economic and organizational
transitions. A few parties raised this point in hearings in a desul
tory way,199 and the 1977 House Report mentioned it briefiy,2oo but
it did not receive much attention or analysis, despite its populist
appeal.201
An important issue in the legislative history, by contrast, con
cerned the question whether the streamlined, pro-management pro
cedures of Chapter XI should govern reorganization of large,
publicly held corporations. Recall that between the late 1930s and
the enactment of the Code in 1978, Chapter XI had become the
preferred means of reorganization even for the public corporations
for which Chapter X had been intended. Creditors supported the
debtors' Chapter XI filings, and courts generally went along, re
sisting the SEC's efforts to convert to Chapter X. Managers pre
ferred Chapter XI because Chapter XI left them in control of the
firm during reorganization and gave them the exclusive right to pro
pose the plan of reorganization.202 Chapter X required the replace
ment of the managers with a trustee. Managers could use their
Chapter XI powers to keep the firm alive while hoping for a change
in market conditions. To be sure, managers did not necessarily ex199. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 623 (statement of Philip A. Loomis,
Commissioner, Securities & Exchange Commission).
200. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 463-64 (1977).
201. Another interesting point is that unions foresaw that firms would have an incentive
under the new law to declare bankruptcy in order to reject collective bargaining agreements.
See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 2425-26 (statement of Max Zimny, General
Counsel, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO); id. at 2437-38 (state
ment of Jeffrey Gibbs, Counsel, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO). Their demands
for restrictions on rejection for that purpose were ignored.
202. See id. at 1874-75 (statement of Harvey R. Miller, William J. Rochelle, Jr., and J.
Ronald Trost, National Bankruptcy Conference).
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ercise their powers under Chapter XI. Studies of recent corporate
bankruptcies show that managers rarely keep their positions after a
firm enters bankruptcy,203 and this was likely the case prior to 1978.
But managers probably could use their Chapter XI powers to ex
tract concessions from the creditors, such as pecuniary compensa
tion or an equity interest in the reorganized firm.204 Managers also
probably liked Chapter Xi's "best interests" standard, which guar
anteed creditors only the liquidation value of their claims. If any
going concern value remained, this could, in principle, be distrib
uted to equityholders such as the managers. In contrast, Chapter
X's absolute priority rule distributed going concern value to inter
ests with the highest priority.
The managers' preference for Chapter XI might lead one to be
lieve that the creditors preferred Chapter X. Although creditors
could buy off managers in a Chapter XI proceeding and have a re
ceiver appointed who would be more sensitive to the creditors' in
terests, surely creditors would have preferred Chapter X, because
under Chapter X they did not have to pay the management to re
sign and they were entitled to the going concern value of the firm.
There are several reasons why creditors - or, at least, some
creditors - nonetheless preferred Chapter XI to Chapter x.2os
First, Chapter X proceedings always took a long time, whereas
Chapter XI proceedings were usually brief. Chapter X required a
large number of formal hearings and reports. Chapter XI proceed
ings were informal. Chapter X required that the SEC review the
plan of reorganization - a process that took a long time - and it
permitted it a thousand other interferences. One source of irrita
tion was the SEC's position that equityholders with fraud claims
had a right to rescission and refund of the purchase price, giving
them priority over creditors.206 Creditors believed that the formal
requirements of Chapter X and SEC participation produced delay,
during which costs mounted and assets dwindled, without creating
any offsetting benefits.
203. See Stuart C. Gilson, Management
. Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. EcoN.
241 (1989).
204. See Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring
1989, at 129 (discussing the issue of managers' incentives to choose to go into bankruptcy and
to choose between liquidation and reorganization).
205. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 450·51 (testimony of Richard Kaufman,
National Association of Credit Management).
206. For a critique, see John J. Slain & Homer Kripke, The Interface Between Securities

Regulation and Bankruptcy - Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between
Securityholders and the Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 261 {1973).
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Second, participating creditors had more influence in Chapter

XI than they did in Chapter X. The creditors could elect their own
receiver to operate the firm under the procedures of Chapter XI once they had obtained resignations from the managers - whereas
they had to submit to the appointment of a trustee by the bank
ruptcy court under the procedures of Chapter X.201 In Chapter X
the SEC challenged trustees who had connections with manage
ment, monitored their administration of the estate, and opposed
any procedures and arrangements that did not meet its standard of
fairness.2os Because the SEC and the bankruptcy court exercised
greater supervision over Chapter X cases than over Chapter XI
cases, participating creditors in Chapter X had less influence over
the outcome of reorganization than they did in Chapter XI.
Third, the practical distinction between the best interests stan
dard and the fair and equitable standard was small. At first sight,
one might think that creditors would prefer Chapter X, because the
absolute priority rule gave creditors the going concern value of the
firm; in Chapter XI the creditors were guaranteed only the liquida
tion value of the firm. When, however, a firm had no going concern
value, which was often the case, the different standards led to the
same outcome. When going concern value existed, the lower stan
dard of Chapter XI did not injure the participating creditors, be
cause it was only a floor and they could use their influence to
negotiate a larger distribution. It could hurt only the nonparticipat
ing creditors. Finally, the requirement that plans be "fair and equi
table," under Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,209 could
not be avoided by consent, and this of course meant that creditors
could not pay off insiders in Chapter X even when the latter could
offer "new value."210
These latter points are crucial. The procedural differences be
tween Chapter X and Chapter XI had a significant effect on the
ability of parties to engage in opportunistic behavior. Chapter XI
favored those parties who participated in the reorganization namely, the managers and the large creditors. Shareholders and
207. Creditors lobbied for control of the trustee in reorganization cases. See, e.g., 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 428 (statement of the National Association of Credit Man

agement). A representative of another creditors' association stated that creditors preferred
Chapter XI to Chapter X, because creditors had less say in Chapter X. See 1975-76 House
Hearings, supra note 54, at 1685 (testimony of K. Richard Kaufman, Assistant Secretary,
Credit Managers Association of Southern California).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
209. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
210. See Ayer, supra note 32, at 999-1001.
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small creditors - such as consumers, employees, and trade credi
tors - would generally not participate, because when one's claim is
small the cost of participation exceeds the expected gains.211 Thus,
in Chapter XI managers and large creditors could conspire to create
a plan that transferred value to them from the small creditors and,
if the :firm was not insolvent, the nonmanagement shareholders.212
Chapter X favored the small creditors and the nonmanagement
shareholders, because the court and the SEC would guard their in
terests. To be sure, large creditors could potentially do better in
Chapter X because of the absolute priority rule, but it appears that
they did better by paying off managers, and freezing out nonman
agement equity and small debt under the quick and informal proce
dures of Chapter Xl,213 than by sharing with small debt and
possibly with equity and· enduring delay under the cumbersome
procedures of Chapter X.
This view receives support from the legislative history. The
large creditors participated vigorously, arguing that the new bank
ruptcy law should follow Chapter XI, not Chapter X, and have in
formal, :flexible procedures even for bankruptcies of large, public
corporations.214 Small creditors were not organized, did hot testify,
and probably had little influence.
Besides the creditors, the most important groups to testify on
reorganization were the lawyers' groups. Creditors' lawyers sup
ported the Chapter XI-type procedures, probably in part because
211. For anecdotal evidence of the costs of serving on creditors' committees, see Why
Creditors Don't Want To Serve on Creditors' Committees, 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) Al (June
17, 1997).
212. A recent example in the news is the ability of top managers of bankrupt corpora
tions to preserve their pension plans while the employees' pension plans lose their value. See
Diana B. Henriques & David Cay Johnston, Managers Staying Dry As Corporations Sink,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at Al. Although the article is not entirely clear, it appears that
some managers use their bargaining power to negotiate for pension protection during
reorganization.
213. The existence of such behavior appears to underlie the SEC's objections to the CB
and the JB. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 762-64. It is also the theory of the
court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
214. See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1744 (prepared statement of Franklin
Cole, Chairman of the Board, Walter Heller & Co., Chicago, Ill.); id. at 1810-35 (comments
submitted by National Commercial Fmance Conference, Inc.; testimony of Eli Silberfield,
General Counsel, National Commercial Fmance Conference, Inc.; testimony of Carroll
Moore, Chairman, Committee on Legislation; testimony of Leon S. Forman, Chairman,
Committee on Preferences, Liens and Title, National Bankruptcy Conference). The bankers,
while also strongly preferring the informal procedures of Chapter XI, would have allowed an
exception for corporate reorganizations that would "materially and adversely affect" the
rights of equity. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 648 (recording the recommenda
tions of the American Life Insurance Association, whose members are major creditors of
corporations); id. at 493, 498-99 (statement of Joseph Patchan, partner at Baker, Hostetler &
Patterson); id. at 1752 (statement of Robert J. Grimmig, American Bankers Association).
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their clients supported them. But the lawyers - particularly law
yers for corporate debtors - had an additional reason to prefer
Chapter XI to Chapter X:
Unfortunately, by filing a chapter XI case not only does the debtor
remain in possession, but the lawyer also remains in control. The law
yer can really control the progress of the proceedings. The lawyer has
an awful lot to do with what happens in that chapter XI proceeding,
and the lawyer for the debtor will be appointed the lawyer for the
debtor in possession, and so he will remain, throughout, in a very ac
tive capacity in a chapter XI case. In a chapter X case that does not
ordinarily follow.21s

In Chapter X a trustee was appointed, and the lawyer would not
earn a very large fee. So lucrative were the positions open to law
yers in reorganizations in Chapter XI that lawyers apparently en
gaged in misbehavior under the procedures of Chapter XI,
particularly in their attempts to obtain control of creditors'
committees.216
It is unclear whether Chapter X or Chapter XI better served the
interests of shareholders, considered from an ex ante perspective.
Chapter XI's "best interests" test gave them a better chance of ob
taining some value from the reorganization than did Chapter X's
requirement of a "fair and equitable" plan; but, as mentioned
before, shareholders were unlikely to receive value under either
test, since managers and creditors do not usually enter a solvent

firm into bankruptcy.

Shareholders may have feared, however, that
managers would enter a solvent firm into bankruptcy in order to
justify a capital restructuring that transferred wealth away from ex
isting shareholders. If the speed of Chapter XI's procedures re
sulted in a lower cost of reorganization when reorganization was
warranted, then shareholders would have preferred Chapter XI; but
if the informality of Chapter XI's procedures enabled management
to manipulate the process in its favor, then the shareholders could
well have preferred Chapter X. That Chapter XI allowed manage
ment to have an interest in the reorganized entity was unlikely to
benefit shareholders; as the SEC argued, there were more straight
forward ways to pay for participation of management if such partic-

215. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 367 (testimony of Lawrence P. King, Associ
ate Dean, New York University Law School, and consultant to the Bankruptcy Commission);
see also 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1911 (testimony of William Rochelle,
National Bankruptcy Conference); H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 247 {1973).
216. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 444 (testimony of Larry Lawrence, Na
tional Association of Credit Management).
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ipation was necessary.217 It seems likely that the optimal
reorganization law for shareholders would have given less power to
management than Chapter XI did - instead, giving power to an
independent trustee, perhaps - while using less cumbersome pro
cedures than those found under Chapter X. Whatever the case,
shareholders did not have a sufficient stake to organize and played
no role in the legislative history.21s
As noted, managers would prefer Chapter XI procedures to
Chapter X procedures, because the former allowed them to remain
in control of the corporate debtor for a certain amount of time.
Despite these benefits, managers did not testify.219 One possible
reason is that managers do not generally believe that their firms will
ever go bankrupt; another possibility is that testimony in favor of
pro-management provisions in bankruptcy would have been bad
public relations.220 The latter point suggests that managers might
have exercised their influence behind the scenes.221 However, cor
porations have never been shy about lobbying state legislators for
protection from takeovers despite the risk of bad public rela
tions.222 Another possible reason is that the gain to managers from
favorable reorganization law was just not that much relative to the
cost of lobbying; in this sense, they may have been an unorganized
and uninfluential group like the shareholders. But even if this were
so, their interests and the interests of commercial bankruptcy law
yers converged, because the lawyers would want their clients - the
managers - to find reorganization attractive so that they would
enter reorganization as much as possible. The managers' interest in
Chapter XI procedures for the reorganization of public corpora
tions under the new bankruptcy law was thus reflected in the
217. See id. at 756 (prepared statement submitted by the Securities & Exchange
Commission).
218. The conventional wisdom is that shareholders have little political influence because
they are not organized, and they are not organized because they have relatively little at stake.
See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105
YALE W. 325, 363-65 (1995). In the 1970s the law discouraged institutional investors from
lobbying, and institutional investors had much less power than they do today. See Edward B.
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 19 GEO.
L.J. 445 (1991).
219. Adler argues that corporate managers would resist efforts to amend the Bankruptcy
Code in a way that would make it more favorable to shareholders. See Adler, supra note 7,
at 343-45. Cf. F.H. Buckley, The American Stay, 3 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.J., 733 (1994) (dis
cussing political influences on the stay); Skeel, supra note 24, at 495-503 (criticizing Adler).
220. See Klee Interview, supra note 82.
221. The Business Roundtable did apparently lobby behind the scenes. See Klee Inter
view, supra note 82.
222. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 5, at 122-26.
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The cleavage between the approaches of Chapter X and Chap
ter XI persisted throughout the legislative history of the Bank
ruptcy Code, and at every stage participants testified in conformity
with their interests, as described above. Most observers agreed that
reorganization of small, closely-held corporations should follow the
informal approach of Chapter XI, because such corporations do not
suffer from the distortions caused by the separation of management
and equity. The chief dispute concerned whether the approach
used for close corporations should also govern large, public corpo
rations. This dispute was often unhelpfully phrased as the question
of whether Chapters X and XI should be consolidated into a single
chapter or should remain separate, but the real issue - the power
to be given to managers of public corporations - is clearly discern
able. Most of those who sought consolidation believed that Chap
ter XI procedures should control in cases involving public
corporations. Everyone who resisted consolidation believed that
rigorous procedures like those in Chapter X should control in cases
involving public corporations. The consolidation language was rhe
torically powerful, because a plea for simplification of the law al
ways has resonance, but it did not affect the substance of the
debate. Some participants advocated consolidation of the chapters
but wanted the law to treat public corporations differently from
close corporations; so they advocated consolidation of Chapters X
and XI but with an exception for public corporations in the (single)
chapter that would result.
The CB is a product of the last strategy. The Commission pro
posed consolidating the two chapters but creating special provisions
for public corporations, albeit in a rather obscure way. Instead of
the absolute priority doctrine implied by Chapter X's requirement
of a "fair and equitable" plan and instead of the liquidation stan
dard implied by Chapter XI's "best interests" test, the CB created a
"fairness test" which had, according to the Commission, the follow
ing characteristics. The absolute priority rule would continue to be
applied, but it would be softened by allowing "another look after
the facts are in" (whatever that means) and by allowing equity to
223. See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1539-40 (statement of Louis W. Levit,
Chainnan, Special Committee of the Judiciary, Commercial Law League) (note rejection of
proposal of automatic subordination of manager claims); id. at 1657 (statement of L.E. Creel,
III, Dallas Bar Association); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 622 (statement of Cali
fornia Bar Association, Committee on Relations of Debtor and Creditor).
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obtain some value if its future contributions, especially in the form
of management, were thought essential to a successful reorganiza
tion. In addition, the court would not make the valuation necessary
for this test if a public corporation was not involved and the parties,
after full disclosure, negotiated a settlement.224 The idea behind
this odd evidentiary provision was that the protection of the abso
lute priority rule would drop away when everyone consented to a
reorganization, but again only in the case of close corporations.
The absolute priority rule with a new value exception would apply
when public securities were involved. In addition, an independent
trustee would be discretionary but presumptive for public corpora
tions, and although the SEC's role would be eliminated, its func
tions

would

be

performed by the bankruptcy

agency.

The

Commission thus recognized the possibility of a greater conflict in
public corporations between the interests of management, on the
one hand, and creditors and shareholders, on the other, than in pri
vate corporations. This difference justified greater procedural pro
tections for

reorganization

of public

corporations

than

for

reorganization of private corporations. Behind the rhetoric of con
solidation, the two-track system prevailed.225
House Bill 8200 followed the CB in emphasizing the importance
of consolidation and in providing for a modified absolute priority
rule that allowed consenting senior creditors to give up some value
to equity in return for cooperation. This idea is uncontroversial
when applied to close corporations, where ownership and control
are undivided, but its application to public corporations raised seri
ous difficulties. The problem is that the modified absolute priority
rule allows management of public corporations to extract value
from creditors by threatening to delay reorganization and to extract
value from small creditors by conspiring with large ones. Indeed,
the Supreme Court had made this point repeatedly in its opinions
on equity receiverships,226 and again when it rejected an argument
that the "fair and equitable test" of Chapter X permitted senior
224. This, in any event, is the Commission's description of the rule. See H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, at 258 (1977). A glance at the rule itself (§ 7-310(d)(2)(B)) does not disclose the basis
of this description; the rule is too vague. See 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 261

app.
225. The JB continued the separate tracks of the old law and appeared not to make many
substantive changes. Because the bankruptcy judges did not feel strongly about this aspect of
their bill, disclaiming their support for it at the first sign of opposition, see 1975-76 House
Hearings, supra note 54, at 1184, I will ignore their views.
226. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); Louisville Trust Co. v. Louis
ville, New Albany and Chicago Ry., 174 U.S. 674 (1899).
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creditors to transfer value to managers in return for cooperation.227
But House Bill 8200 did not, unlike the CB, provide the "eviden
tiary" restriction on reorganization of public corporations. House
Bill 8200 did not differentiate public and private corporations at all.
Moreover, House Bill 8200 further weakened the absolute priority
rule by applying it to classes of creditors, rather than to every credi
tor, so a senior creditor would lose value to junior creditors if out
voted by other creditors in its class. House Bill 8200 also did not
provide for an automatic trustee, and it denied standing to the SEC.
In these ways, House Bill 8200's treatment of reorganization of
public corporations followed the informal route of Chapter XI,
even more so than did the CB, and in contradiction to prior law.
Senate Bill 2266, which maintained separate rules for public and
private corporations, differed crucially from House Bill 8200 by for
bidding management and creditors of public corporations to agree
to a reorganization that locks out the shareholders and small credi
tors. Senate Bill 2266 endorsed the absolute priority rule in all its

rigor. In particular, Senate Bill 2266 would have made confirma
tion of the plan depend on the court's finding that objecting classes
(including equity) received adequate value. Senate Bill 2266 also
provided for the automatic appointment of trustees for bankrupt
cies of public corporations, for standing for the SEC as the repre
sentative of unorganized shareholders and bondholders, and for a
larger judicial role in valuing the business and assuring that the plan
is fair. Whereas the House argued that shareholders were more so
phisticated than they were when the Chandler Act was passed and
could protect themselves as long as sufficient disclosure is made,228
the Senate insisted that shareholders in public corporations had to
be protected from attempts by managers and large creditors to
freeze them out.229
What explains the House's and Senate's divergence over the
formality of procedures for the reorganization of public corpora
tions? One explanation draws on the observation that lawyers and
large creditors supported informal procedures. The House's con
stituency consisted of the populous urban areas where large corpo
rations, with many employees and vast :financial resources,
exercised their greatest influence. The corporations exercised their
influence through their managers, and these managers had strong
incentives to preserve their power, even at the expense of the sharev. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
The full explanation is confusing. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 222-24 (1977).
'129. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 9-10 (1978).

'121.
'128.

See Case
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holders they represented. When a firm enters bankruptcy, the man
agers would like to retain control as long as possible and to have as
much leverage as possible with respect to the creditors. The reader
will be reminded of the recent successful efforts of entrenched man
agement to lobby state legislatures for takeover protection that
benefited the management at the expense of the shareholders.23° If
managers exercised influence behind the scenes, they would have
more influence over the House than over the Senate.
Also in the populous urban areas were the powerful banks and
other large creditors, which, expecting to have large enough claims
to find it worthwhile to participate in reorganizations, preferred
rules that maximized the influence of participants over proceedings;
and the lawyers, who preferred the informal procedures of Chapter
XI, which maximized their business and their control over the pro
ceedings. The Senate, by contrast, was disproportionately con
trolled by smaller, less populous states, where managers of big
businesses, large creditors, and lawyers231 existed in smaller num
bers and had less influence.232 Lacking influential constituents with
a strong interest in management and big credit, senators may have
been open to the influence of the SEC,233 which supported stricter
procedures and standards for reorganization of public corpora
tions234 - probably to protect its turf but probably also to protect
public investors. Another possible explanation is that senators be
lieved that protection of shareholders and junior debtholders was in
the public interest,235 though this hardly explains why members of
the House did not take a similar view. More plausible, given the
disproportionate influence of rural states in the Senate, is that the
Senate's position reflected the populist fear of the power of vast
public corporations, the same fear that produced Chapter X forty
years earlier.236
230. See Romano, supra note 5 at 120-42.
231. That lawyers had more influence in the House than in the Senate is shown by their
greater success in the House than in the Senate in obtaining provisions granting generous
attorneys' fees in bankruptcy cases. The House prevailed on this issue in the final bill. See
124 CoNG. REc. 33,994 (1978).
232. This is a simplification. In some small states a few large creditors have dispropor
tionate influence; for example, Aetna in Connecticut See Romano, supra note 5 at 122-39.
233. The SEC apparently had a powerful friend in Senator Roth. See Klee Interview,
supra note 82.
234. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 71, at 732-33, 754-56 (summary of recommen
dations and statement of Securities & Exchange Commission).
235. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978).
236. See Skeel, supra note 24.
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The support for special protections in the case of public corpo
rations was thus awfully thin, and it is not surprising that the Senate
conceded almost completely to the House on these issues during
the final negotiations. The final bill did not contain special distribu
tion rules for public corporations, and it kept the House's watered
down absolute priority rule. Although the final language was not
explicit on this issue, it appeared to contain the new value exception
sought by the House.237 The face-saving concessions to the Senate
were meager: most notable, permission for the SEC to appear in
bankruptcy court but not to appeal adverse orders, the automatic
appointment of an examiner for the bankruptcy of public corpora
tions, and the prohibition on issuing nonvoting stock.238 The exam
iner could perform an investigation and issue a report on the
debtor, but it did not have the standing or the coercive powers of
the trustee. The interests of large creditors, the lawyers, and man
agers had prevailed over those of the shareholders and the small
creditors, a result consistent with what appears to have been the
distribution of political power.
VIII.
A.

MISCELLANEOUS

Student Loans

The Commission Report recommended that educational loans
not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.239 The recommendation appar
ently grew out of a concern that the increasing frequency of such
discharges would undermine the student loan system. During the
House and Senate hearings banks and other creditors, academic in
stitutions, bankruptcy lawyers, bankruptcy judges, and several
members of Congress testified in support of dischargeability.240 No
237. On this, see Ayer, supra note 32. See also Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993). Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 484 U.S. 197 (1988), left the issue open.
238. See 124 CoNG. REc. 34,003-09 (1978).
239. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 12 (1973).
240. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 619 (supplemental statement of Com
mercial Law League); 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 981 (statement of Bank
ruptcy Judge Clive W. Bare); id. at 1029 (testimony of Walter W. Vaughan, Vice President,
American Security Bank, and Chairman, American Bankers Association and Consumers
Bankers Association Task Forces on Bankruptcy); id. at 1127-30 (statement of Clarissa Gil
bert, President, U.S. National Student Association); id. at 1301 (statement of Bankruptcy
Judge Joe Lee); id. at 1339 (statement of Paul L. Winkler, bankruptcy attorney); id. at 1368
(statement of Alvin O. Wiese, Jr., National Consumer Finance Association); 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 72, at 315, 329 (statement and testimony of Richard A. Hesse, National
Consumer Law Center); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 132 (1977). But see 1975-76 House Hear
ings, supra note 54, at 1394 (statement of Credit Union Association) (opposing dis
chargeability); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 215-22 (statement of Sheldon
Steinbach, American Council on Education).
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major interest groups opposed dischargeability, but several mem
bers of Congress testified in opposition to dischargeability. House
Bill 8200 provided that educational loans would be dischargeable,
as under the prior law.241 Senate Bill 2266 provided that educa
tional loans would not be dischargeable within five years of matur
ity. The final bill reflected the Senate's version.
Academic institutions benefited from dischargeability, because
it transferred the burden of paying tuition from students to the gov
ernment, artificially inflating the demand for education. Creditors
benefited, because they earned interest on the loans but incurred
no risk, because the government guaranteed the loans. Lawyers
benefited, because recent graduates' main liabilities consisted of
their student loans, and they had to hire lawyers in order to have
them discharged. The victim of the dischargeability rule was the
diffuse and unorganized public. However, the abuse of the system
and the cost and unfairness to the taxpayer were clear enough that
politicians could score points with voters by taking a public stand
against dischargeability. The apparently opportunistic failure to
pay debts, at the taxpayer's expense, was doubtless more readily
comprehended and condemned by the average voter than the eso
teric details of corporate reorganization and judicial administration.
This may explain the unusually frequent testimony of members of
Congress during the hearings. By testifying (and, of course, voting)
in favor of nondischargeability, they created a record that would
help them during their next election.242 Members of Congress not
directly influenced by constituents on this issue may also have
feared the budgetary implications of the government's increasing
liability for discharged student loans.243
B.

The Fraud Exception To Discharge

The House and Senate agreed to retain the 1898 Act's exception
to discharge for debts issued after debtors had filed false financial
statements with creditors. As one might expect, creditors and their
lawyers generally testified in favor of the exception; debtors' law
yers testified in opposition of the exception.244 The latter argued
241. See H.R. REP No. 95-595, at 132-34.
242. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 1087-94 (Rep. John N.
Erlenborn, Illinois); id. at 1098-1127 (Rep. Edwin D. Eshleman, Pennsylvania); 124 CONG.
REc. 1791-93 (Rep. Allen E. Ertel, Pennsylvania).
243. See generally H.R. REP No. 95-595, at 536-38 (supplemental views of Rep. Ertel).
244. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 970 (testimony of Bernard Sha
.

.

piro, California attorney) (noting that the National Bankruptcy Conference opposes excep
tion); id. at 897-902 (statement of Linn K. 1\vinem, attorney, Beneficial Fmance System)
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that creditors abused the fraud exception in two ways. Some credi
tors would give consumer debtors highly complex financial forms to
fill out in the hope that the complexity would lead to mistakes, the
mistakes could be represented as intentional misrepresentation, and
thus the debt would be made nondischargeable. Creditors would
also threaten to sue debtors for fraud in the hope of extracting from
them a reaffirmation of their debts.245 The Commission had taken
these claims seriously and recommended that the exception be
eliminated.246 However, Congress compromised between the inter
ests by adding some fee-shifting provisions designed to compensate
debtors who litigate false claims of fraud.
C.

Reaffirmation

Under the 1898 Act a debtor could reaffirm any debts dis
chargeable in bankruptcy. Debtors' lawyers, the FTC, and many
academics opposed the right to reaffirm, arguing that creditors ob
tained reaffirmations through bullying and deception, thus depriv
ing the debtor of a fresh start.247 Creditors and creditors' lawyers

supported reaffirmation, no doubt because it reduced their bank
ruptcy losses a great deal. But they also made the plausible argu
ment that the debtors themselves benefited from the right to
reaffirm, as it enabled them to acquire new credit and to retain val
ued collateral.248 No one has noticed that a prohibition on reaffir
mation would discourage debtors from filing for bankruptcy: by
reducing their ability to obtain credit after bankruptcy, such a pro
hibition would make bankruptcy less attractive. The final law per
mitted reaffirmation, but also required approval by the bankruptcy
court and established a thirty-day cooling-off period during which
the debtor could unilaterally rescind the reaffirmation.
(supporting exception); id.· at 923-25 (statement of Benjamin L. Zelenko, creditors' lawyer)
(supporting exception); cf. id. at 891-93 (testimony of Phillip Shuchman, Law Professor, Uni
versity of Connecticut).
245. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 130-31.
246. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 176 (1973).
247. See, e.g., 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 54, at 943 (statement of Ernest L.
Sarason, Jr., National Consumer Law Center); id. at 762-63 (statement of David H. Williams,
attorney, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission); id. at 873 (testimony
of Philip Shuchman, Professor of Law, University of Connecticut).
248. See, e.g., id. at 902-03 (statement of Linn K. 1\vinem, attorney, Beneficial Finance
System); id. at 1023 (statement of Walter W. Vaughan, Vice President, American Security
Bank; and Chairman, American Bankers Association and Consumers B ankers Association
Task Forces on Bankruptcy).
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CONCLUSION
The dominant academic view of the Bankruptcy Code is that it
works well. This view is not hard to understand. The Bankruptcy
Code is in many respects an elegant and sophisticated piece of legis
lation. The 1898 Act had become intolerably ambiguous and
archaic, really quite horrible, and the 1978 Act swept away the
years of doctrinal cobwebs and incrustations, replacing them with a
lucid, simple, and apparently humane system for dealing with
overburdened debtors and helpless corporations.
The academic view, however, makes a typical lawyerly mistake:
it confuses improvement in doctrine with improvement in policy.
That post-1978 doctrine is clearer and simpler than pre-1978 doc
trine does not mean that it better serves the public interest. Indeed,
measured by the standards set for itself by the 1973 Commission,
the Bankruptcy Code must be considered a failure.
Recall that the Commission listed the following complaints with
the old system: (1) the rapid increase in the rate of bankruptcy fil
ings (208,329 filings in 1967); (2) administrative waste; (3) insuffi
cient generosity for debtors and failure by creditors to collect in
bankruptcy; (4) lack of uniformity in the· treatment of debtors; and
(5) negligence and abuse on the part of bankruptcy professionals.249
The 1978 Act has not solved these problems. First, as discussed in
more detail below, since 1978 bankruptcy rates have skyrocketed to
over one million per year. Second, the efficiency of the current
bankruptcy system is doubtful. From July 1, 1990, to June 30, 1992,
for example, the total cost of the 1.2 million consumer chapter 7
cases exceeded gross receipts in these cases by almost $100 million
and distributions to creditors by about $250 million.250 Third, ex
emption laws are more generous today than they were before 1978,
but the generosity of exemptions is mostly a matter of state law.
There are no statistics on the extent to which creditors use the
bankruptcy system rather than swallowing losses from unpaid loans.
Fourth, because of the role of state exemption law in the Bank
ruptcy Code, debtors continue to be treated nonuniformly. Fifth,
although anecdotal evidence suggests that negligence and abuse are
249. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
250. See GENERAL Govr. DIV., U.S. GEN. AccoUNTINo OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/GGD94-173, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: CASE RECEIP'IS PAID TO CREDITORS AND PROFES
SIONALS, at 34 tbl.11.2 (1994). For consumer bankruptcies, gross receipts were $427.4 million,
creditor distributions were $273.6 million, total costs were $521.3 million - including bank
ruptcy court costs and trustee and debtor attorney compensation, but not apparently includ
ing creditors' lawyers. For business bankruptcies, gross receipts were $15 billion, creditor
distributions were $929 million, and total costs were $461 million. See id.
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less widespread today than prior to 1978, the lack of systematic evi
dence of this behavior both now and then makes generalization
hazardous.
Now, it is doubtful that the 1973 Commission's rather haphazard
list of complaints about the old law should be the standard for eval
uating the Bankruptcy Code, and the statistics should be read care
fully. One might criticize a private company that spent almost twice
as much money to collect from debtors than it received from them,
but the Bankruptcy Code's goals are more complicated. The perti
nent question is whether, supposing the goals are proper, some
other system would achieve them more cheaply. The answer to this
question would take us beyond the scope of this paper. A more
modest approach to bankruptcy reform draws on this article's con
clusions about the political history of the 1978 Act. We can use
these conclusions to evaluate complaints recently directed at that
law and ask about the nature and likelihood of reform.

Consumer bankruptcy filings and exemptions. Many commenta
tors worry about the rapid growth of consumer bankruptcies since
1978. Recall that the 1973 Commission had mentioned as a reason
for bankruptcy reform the growth of bankruptcy filings from 10,196
in 1946 to 208,329 in 1967.251 In 1996 bankruptcy filings exceeded 1
million. One can obtain a more accurate sense of the trend by ob
serving that from 1920 to 1960, between about 1 in 2000 and 1 in
4000 people :filed for bankruptcy, with no clear trend up or down.
There was an anomalous dip in the mid-1940s, probably as a result
of post-war prosperity. From 1960 to 1978, there was a gradual up
ward trend in filings, from about 1 in 2000, to about 1 in 1000.
From 1978 to 1996, filings increased from 1 in 1000 to about 1 in
270.252 A recent study suggests that a considerably larger portion of
the population, ranging from fifteen percent to twenty-three per
cent, would benefit financially from filing for bankruptcy, and even
larger portions would benefit if individuals engaged in sophisticated
prebankruptcy planning.253 Although academics disagree about the
extent to which the increase in filings reflect the influence of the
251. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 2.
252. These statistics are published every year. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., .ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES CoURTS 117-21 {1978). For a compilation of statistics, see Joseph Pomykala, The
Division and Destruction ofValue: An Economic Analysis ofBankruptcy Law, at app. E & F
(1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
253. See Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy? (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Bankruptcy Code,254 it is clear that if the quantity of bankruptcy
filings was a problem in the 1960s, the Code has not solved it.
One explanation for the increase in the filing rate is the rise in
the generosity of state exemptions. There is, however, little evi
dence for this view. But even if the view were correct, Congress
can do little about exemptions, as they are determined by state law.
Although some creditors and commentators advocate uniform fed
eral exemptions, it is no more likely that Congress can preempt
state exemption laws today than it could in 1978. Indeed, given re
cent trends in the devolution of power from the federal government
to the states, a system of uniform federal exemptions appears more
unlikely now that it did in the 1970s. A further irony should be
observed. Most of the states that opted out of the federal exemp
tions in 1979 and the early 1980s did so in order to force debtors to
use stingier state exemptions;255 but now many - possibly most of the opt-out states provide for exemptions that are more generous
than federal exemptions. The National Bankruptcy Review Com
mission will recommend a system of uniform federal exemptions for
some property and floors and ceilings on state exemptions with re
spect to other property.256

Double appeals. Bankruptcy litigants must appeal adverse rul
ings to the district court, and from there to the circuit court and the
Supreme Court. Commentators criticize this rule, seeing little rea
son to believe that bankruptcy disputes need three levels of appeal
when ordinary civil disputes need only two. We have seen that this
system is an artifact of the federal judiciary's attempt to maintain
their prestige prior to 1978. The double appeal system was a con
cession to the federal judges, a symbol of the subordination of the
bankruptcy court to the district court. Assuming that the federal
judiciary no longer would exert political pressure on this issue (as
254. See Wtlliam J. Boyes & Roger L. Faith, Some Effects ofthe Bankruptcy Reform Act
of1978, 29 J.L. & EcoN. 139 (1986); Ian Domowitz & Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978 on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 803 (1993); Rich
ard L. Peterson & Kiyomi Aoki, Bankruptcy Filings Before and After Implementation of the
Bankruptcy Reform Law, 36 J. EcoN. & Bus. 95 (1984); Lawrence Shepard, Personal Failures
and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 419 (1984); Alden F. Shiers &
Daniel P. Williamson, Nonbusiness Bankruptcies and the Law: Some Empirical Results, 21 J.
CoNSUMER A.FF. 277 (1987); Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bank
ruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1 (1987); F.H. Buckley & Margaret F.
Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle (Jan. 24, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 62 QJ. EcoN. 217
(1997), presents evidence that generous exemptions restrict credit to low-asset households
and expand credit to high-asset households.
255. See TERESA A. SuLUVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE Oua DEBTORS 44 n.23 (1989).
256. See Commission Endorses Uniform Federal Exemptions Proposal, 30 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) All (June 3, 1997).
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seems plausible), the system will probably be abolished, as it should
be.

The NBRC has voted to eliminate the double appeals

system.257

Article III standing for bankruptcy courts. The NBRC will rec

ommend that bankruptcy courts be given Article III status.2ss It
will be interesting to see whether the federal judiciary will raise ob
jections again. Because the bankruptcy judiciary has become more
respectable, the federal judiciary might see in its elevation less of a
threat to its status than in 1978. Even if federal judges raise objec
tions to the elevation of bankruptcy judges, jurisdictional confusion
and other difficulties raised by the bankruptcy courts' awkward po
sition in the judiciary may cause Congress to ignore such objections.

The U.S. Trustee System. In a recent survey of the members of
the American Bankruptcy Institute, the U.S. Trustee System was
most frequently listed in response to a question asking for the three
most important problems in the bankruptcy system.259 Although
the survey does not supply the reasons for the respondents' dissatis
faction, other sources suggest that bankruptcy lawyers think that
the U.S. Trustees do not appoint trustees in a fair way, possibly en
gaging in cronyism; intervene in cases on the basis of their publicity,
rather than on the basis of the merit of the intervention; object to
reasonable legal practices; do not perform adequate supervision; is
sue inappropriate guidelines that do not take account of local varia
tions in legal culture and practice; and have little influence over
bankruptcy judges.260 Accusations (and admissions) of patronage
in the system were mentioned earlier. Many of these problems can
be traced to the centralization of an institution whose purpose is
inherently local. The political history of the 1978 Act gives reason
to doubt that the current system is desirable. It is possible that
bankruptcy judges who hold office today would appoint trustees

257. See Why the Commission Supports Change in Appellate Structure, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec.

(CRR) A5 (Jan. 14, 1997).

258. See Commission Votes on Tough Issues, Picks Up Momentum, 6 Consumer Bankr.

News (CRR) 6, 7 (Jan. 16, 1997).

259. See AB/ Releases Final Results of Bankruptcy Survey Part 1: Overview/Business Re·
organization Issues, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) A3, A3 (Jan. 14, 1997).
260. See, e.g., Levin & Klee, supra note 28, at 4-5; Why Is the U.S. Trustee Program Such a
Lightening Rod?, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) Al (Oct. 22, 1996); see also Peter C. Alexander,
A Proposal to Abolish the Office ofthe United States Trustee, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1996);
Linda J. Rusch, Unintended Consequences of Unthinking Tmkering: The 1994 Amendments
and the Chapter 11 Process, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 354 & n.31 (1995) (citing cases in which

courts criticize the U.S. Trustee's appointments).
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more honestly than the pre-1978 judges and than the current
Trustees.261
The bankruptcy judge's administrative powers. Some commen
tators have argued that bankruptcy judges should have greater ad
ministrative powers than they do under the 1978 Act.262 Recall that
the elimination of the bankruptcy judges' administrative powers
under the 1898 Act may have been motivated by the desire to en
hance their status. It was thought that because an administratively
engaged judge would look like a participant, he or she would ap
pear to take sides and not to have the dignified cloak of impartial
ity. Whether or not this is true, the political motivation behind the
separation of administrative powers and the normative justification
should be kept separate, and the legal distinction rethought.
The debtor-in-possession model and the absolute priority rule.
Many commentators believe that managers have too much control
over the corporate debtor during reorganization.263 Some object to
the difficulty of replacing incompetent managers with trustees;264
others object to the exclusivity period.265 We saw that large credi
tors prefer to deal with managers rather than trustees, that lawyers
also prefer to keep managers in control during reorganization, and
that these groups made their influence felt during negotiations over
the new bankruptcy law. Because the amount of authority given to
managers during reorganization reflected the balance of political
power and not necessarily the public interest, modification of the
debtor-in-possession rules may be justified. A similar point can be
made about the current version of the absolute priority rule: it
more likely reflects the interests of the creditors and lawyers who
lobbied Congress in the 1970s than the interest of the public.
Reaffirmation. There still exists a conflict between those who
support and those who oppose the right to reaffirm debts. The 1978
Act's compromise - the cooling-off period and the requirement of
judicial approval - appears to be routinely circumvented. Debtors
reaffirm their debts outside the bankruptcy proceeding, and state
courts enforce the reaffirmation when debtors breach the con261. See GENERAL GOVT. DIV., U.S. GEN. AccoUNTINo OFFICE, supra note 119.
262. See, e.g., Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter
11 Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR. LJ. w, 311-15 {1993).
263. See, e.g., Should Debtors Have to Prove a Trustee ls Not Needed?, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec.

(CRR) A3, A3 (Dec. 3, 1996).

264. See id.
265. See Give the Commission a Piece of Your Mind, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) Al, A14
(Oct. 15, 1996).
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tract.266 It is unsurprising that a last-minute political compromise
would not take into account this difficulty of coordination in a fed
eral system. If circumvention is in fact routine, the restrictions on
reaffirmation should either be dropped or strengthened, depending
on one's view about the value of reaffirmations.
*

*

*

Some readers might take this political history of the 1978 Act as
an indication of the futility of legislative reform. If politics deter
mines legislative outcomes, what is the purpose of reform? But
such pessimism is unjustified. The lessons of the analysis are con
crete and practical. Because of the indeterminacy of the normative
arguments for and against various kinds of bankruptcy reform, one
must rely on experience and history. The experience of lawyers and
courts tells us which parts of the law create practical difficulties.
History tells us which parts of the law reflect political compromises
rather than normative goals. Because the political forces that led to
unsatisfactory compromises in 1978 have changed, there is hope
that proper amendments can now be made. But it must also be
acknowledged that reformers face a new set of political forces in
1997, and these forces will limit the extent to which improvement
can be achieved.

266. See Commission and NCBJ Examine Consumer Bankruptcy Issues, 6 Consumer
Banlcr. News (CRR) 1, 7 (Nov. 21, 1996).

